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Summary (Abstract)
The polygraph, and other methods of lie detection, measure the physiological 
arousal thought to accompany attempts to deceive. Traditional methods of lie 
detection, however, have failed to acquire the accuracy and consistency necessary to 
be relied upon in important applications. The reason for this is that there is not a 
sufficient understanding of why people exhibit physiological arousal when they are 
deceptive, and how they come to have these responses. The current thesis explores 
how classical conditioning can be used to explain the physiological arousal a person 
has to their own deception, and how this might come about in the normal social 
conditioning of the individual. Chapters 1 discusses the background of lie detection 
to this point, current methods in use, and the current understanding of why people 
exhibit physiological arousal when they are deceptive. Chapter 2 covers some of the 
technical aspects of the experiments presented in this thesis, such as the experiment 
programs and environment used. Chapter 3 of the current thesis examined the 
punishment of verbal behaviors in a person’s past conditioning can cause them to 
exhibit increased physiological arousal when engaging in that behavior. Chapters 4 
and 5 explored the classical conditioning of eyeblink and skin conductance responses 
to deception and truth-value in a laboratory setting. Chapter 6 further explored the 
classical conditioning of a skin conductance response to instances of deception 
regarding an internally consistent context, and the generalization of these conditioned 
responses to instances of deception that only the subject knew about. In conclusion, 
the current thesis argued that the responses relied upon by traditional methods of lie 
detection can be explained using a behavioral explanation based on classical 
conditioning and past punishment. Classical conditioning, it is argued, can provide a 
more direct explanation of the responses exhibited, and potentially a powerful tool 
for improving the responses we rely upon to detect deception.
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Chapter 1: 
Deception and its Detection
Chapter 1
1.1 Deception
“A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is 
constituted to be that profound secret to every other” (Dickens,
1859, pg. 21).
Everybody lies. Studies have shown that practically everyone asked lies about 
something, and people lie on the average 1 to 2 times per day (Depaulo et al., 1996; 
Ennis, 2008; Kashy & Depaulo, 1996). Not all deception is harmful, of course. 
Interpersonal deception is often whimsical, and even sometimes apparently for the 
benefit of the deceived (Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997).
Deception is commonly employed to manipulate the behavior of other 
organisms. The orchid may have a petal simulating the appearance of a female 
insect, tricking male insects into “mating” with it and spreading pollen (Campbell, 
2001). Butterflies in South America will mimic, in colouring pattern, their 
unpalatable relative the Heliconidae to avoid being devoured (Darwin, 1871). The 
killdeer fakes a broken wing, luring predators away from its young (Davis, 1943). 
These are all instances where natural selection has chosen individuals that avoid 
predation or spread their seed more successfully.
Human deception is different, primarily in its complexity and diversity. Unlike 
most animals, humans are able to communicate their environments, past and present, 
to a tremendous extent. One human can report to another where they typically live, 
what they typically do, where they will be the next day, what they will be doing, and 
who they will be with, all in a matter of minutes. This is impossible in any other 
species, as they do not have the capacity for verbal behavior. Despite the capacity 
we can communicate with each other, it is not always in an individual’s best interest 
to be accurate. Hence humans are deceptive. It is the attempted detection of this 
deception that will be the topic of this thesis. While deception as an operant 
behavior is a fascinating field, and much could be written about it, the present work 
will focus on the side-effects of deception that have made its detection possible.
While it could be argued that not all deception is verbal behavior, verbal 
deception seems to be the most common among humans, and certainly the most 
troubling. The current work will therefore focus primarily on verbal instances of 
deception. Additionally, this work will focus on instances of deception where the 
speaker knows that they are being deceptive.
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1.1.1 Practical implications of deception
Perhaps the most obvious general situation in which an individual is likely to 
be deceptive is when one seeks information from another regarding the latter’s 
engagement in punishable behavior. Obviously, the truthful disclosure of such 
behavior will be punished, making the truthful reporting of such behavior also 
punishing. Thus the child “did not” put their hand into the cookie jar. This has been 
perhaps the core problem plaguing criminal justice systems since there have been 
what could be called criminal justice systems (Fisher, 1997). A person’s verbal 
behavior will not predictably tell us whether they have engaged in the crime for 
which they are questioned. If it did, criminal justice systems would be so precise, 
scientific, and effective by our own time that they, and the society they serve, would 
be unrecognizable to us. If it were known, in every case, with certainty whether a 
particular suspect had, or had not, committed an offense, a mild consequence would 
be the lack of need for juries, courts, and judges; a major consequence would be that 
few people would ever engage in offenses. Very seldom do people engage in highly 
or mildly punishable behaviors for which they are certain to be caught. If the 
criminal justice system were more precise and effective in determining guilt, there 
would be a small fraction of the guilt to determine.
As such, every criminal justice system ever conceived and implemented has 
had its various means of determining whether a suspect is deceptive in proclaiming 
their innocence (little of any system’s effort has ever been expended in cases where 
suspects readily admit to the offense). Witnesses have been called, questioning has 
been harsh in seeking inconsistencies, and interrogation has sought- through negative 
reinforcement via all forms of aversive stimuli- to reward confessions. This has been 
the state of all criminal justice systems throughout our history: the capacity for a 
suspect to deceive has made them less effective, and more brutal. As argued by 
Fisher (1997), in our own time jury trials have become accepted as the most 
reasonable means to this end. Two parties debate the guilt of a suspect, presenting 
evidence and witnesses, and a panel of non-professional peers have the burden 
placed upon their shoulders to decide who made the best argument: prosecutor or 
defence. In this way, the modem jury system avoids the appearance of barbarity, 
while masking its ineffectiveness in discovering deception and guilt by resting the
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responsibility upon randomly selected peers (Fisher, 1997). This is the modem 
solution to the problem, despite the fact that humans, judges, and jurors are little 
better than chance when it comes to detecting deception- meaning they are nearly as 
likely to confidently report an innocent person deceptive as they are to report them 
innocent (Andrewartha, 2008). The core of the problem remains, as it always has 
been: deception. Given the importance of deception to systems of criminal justice, 
the possibility of directly detecting it has not, of course, been overlooked.
1.2 The Detection of Deception
1.2.1 Historical Methods
The endeavour of lie detection is old, and the methods that have been 
employed are various. Many early attempts at lie detection utilized methods such as 
torture to negatively reinforce confessions (Fisher, 1997). In medieval English 
courts, for example, a suspect’s honesty was often determined using the fire or water 
ordeal (Sullivan, 2001), in which the suspect was allowed to choose fire or water. If 
fire was chosen, the suspect would be forced to endure walking on hot coals, put 
their tongue to hot iron, or some other exposure to extreme heat. If they were not 
burned, they were telling the truth. If they were burned, they were lying and 
punished (often with death). If the suspected liar chose the water ordeal, they were 
stuffed in a sack and tossed into a body of water. If they floated, they were thought a 
liar, and executed. If they sank, they were thought honest and released (It is 
interesting to reason that one cause for a suspect to float is inhaling and holding their 
breath prior to hitting the water- as they might do if they expected to sink). The 
above methods of determining deception were based on magical and religious 
assumptions that the innocent were protected from false punishment (Sullivan,
2001).
Other historical methods used primitive means of measuring physiological 
arousal. In ancient China, it was said that putting a handful of rice into one’s mouth, 
producing a statement in question, and then attempting to spit the rice forth would 
tell if one was telling the truth (Ford, 2006); a method that holds a tenuous 
association with physiological arousal as a dry mouth is often associated with stress 
and increased arousal. Since these times, the advancing technologies have driven 
forward attempts at lie detection, often without any advancement in the theoretical
4
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underpinnings of the methods employed. We still, on the whole, measure 
physiological arousal, on the same assumption that “guilt” or “fear” will connect this 
arousal to the deceptive situation more than the truthful situation. Below is an 
outline of some of the modem approaches that have developed to detect deception.
1.2.2 Modern approaches to lie detection:
From measures of autonomic arousal to voice stress analysis (which measures 
the changes in vocal cord tension accompanying stress), the underlying premise of 
most modem approaches to lie detection is that deception is accompanied by 
increased arousal of the sympathetic nervous system. As will be seen in this section, 
each practical method of detecting deception used today relies on this assumption. 
Different methods of measuring deception are, in fact, simply different methods of 
measuring physiological arousal. The exception, perhaps, to this rule is brain 
imaging, which will be discussed below.
1.2.2.1 Autonomic indicators
The polygraph is the best known, and perhaps most successful, technique of 
measuring the physiological arousal thought to accompany deception (National 
Research Council (NRC), 2003), and will be discussed in more detail below. The 
polygraph, however, is one of many methods of detecting deception that relies 
directly on arousal of the sympathetic nervous system. For example, studies have 
attempted to use thermal facial imaging technology, in which infrared cameras are 
used to detect the increased blood flow to the face that accompanies physiological 
arousal (Pollina & Ryan, 2002). While the authors report high success rates in 
detecting deception using this method, as reported by the NRC (2003), this study 
does not provide sufficient scientific evidence to support the use of this technology 
in the detection of deception. Pavlidis et al. (2002) used a mock crime scenario to 
test the accuracy with which thermal facial imaging could identify guilty and 
innocent subjects. They correctly identified 75% of the guilty subjects, and 90% of 
the innocent subjects, upon which they claimed to have acquired comparable 
accuracy to the polygraph. They had therefore discovered a more convenient method 
of results similar to the polygraph. While some have argued that future research 
should attempt to combine thermography with traditional polygraph measures to try
5
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to improve the combined result (Pollina et al., 2006), this simply creates a more 
complicated measure of physiological arousal- based on a combination of measures 
that each received comparable results to begin with.
1.2.2.2 Voice stress analysis
Related to physiological arousal is the assumption that deception causes 
increased stress, which affects the vocal cords during speech- increasing vocal 
tension and pitch (NRC, 2003). Theoretically, this should provide similar (if 
somewhat less sensitive) measurements to the polygraph and other measurements of 
stress during deception. Voice stress analysis received much attention for a period 
(BPS, 2004; NRC, 2003). The results of voice stress analysis, however, are as 
precariously related to deception as in other methods, probably because numerous 
other stimuli can cause vocal tension besides the act of being deceptive. For these 
reasons, the National Research Council concluded that the research on voice stress 
analysis offers “little or no scientific basis for the use o f ... voice measurement 
instruments as an alternative to the polygraph ...” (NRC, 2003). Other researchers 
have drawn similar conclusions regarding its lack of reliability (Wain & Downey, 
1987). Voice stress analysis is of interest, for our purposes, simply because it is 
another example of an attempt to measure deception by physiological arousal.
1.2.2.3 Demeanor and body language
Another technique commonly used to detect deception is observation of a 
person’s overt behavior. This includes their posture, gaze, facial expressions, the 
sound of their voice, and body movements during an interview or interrogation. The 
use of demeanour is unique in that it does not require equipment, relying only on the 
observation of trained experts. While this method is used in many government 
organizations in the U.S., and probably helps improve the effectiveness of their 
agents in everyday functioning, as an independent method of detecting deception it is 
not as effective as the polygraph. According to Ekman et al. (1991), a group of 
trained U.S. secret Service agents averaged 64% accuracy in correctly identifying 
deceptive responses, when chance is 50%. This is far below any practicable 
accuracy for relying on a method of deception detection.
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1.2.2.4 Brain function
With the improvement of technology capable of measuring brain functioning, 
various attempts have been made to apply this to detecting deception. For example, 
the fMRI measures the amount of oxygen contained in the blood flow to regions of 
the brain, allowing researchers to measure activation levels of various regions. 
Several approaches have been made to using this capacity for detecting deception 
and hidden information. Studies have shown that seeing familiar names and faces 
produce distinguishable differences in activation from unfamiliar names and faces 
(e.g. Tsivilis, Otten, & Rugg, 2001; Shah et al., 2001). This could potentially lead, 
with further development, to methods of determining if a suspect has specific 
information that provides evidence in their case. Another method of using this 
technology involves measuring activation in regions of the brain associated with 
anxiety (e.g. the amygdala and regions of the prefrontal cortex) (Davidson, 2002). 
While further development of these techniques and technologies may eventually lead 
to more reliable methods of detecting deception, there are reasons to believe that this 
will not be as straightforward as finding the patterns associated with deception 
(NRC, 2003). Identifying areas of brain activation associated with deception, 
according to NRC (2003) is not on the horizon. Nor is it clear that such areas exist 
or will ever be identified. Additionally, fMRI studies rely on averaging across 
subjects to find patterns in activation. While this may be useful in research 
attempting to associate particular regions of the brain with particular “functions,” in 
the case of deception detection- in which individual deception is the target to be 
measured, this is not practical (NRC, 2003).
Other attempts at applying brain activation to detecting deception have come 
from the use of EEG and event-related potentials. Laboratory studies have shown 
that the P300 component of the event-related potential can be used to classify 
roughly 85% of deceptive examinees (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Johnson & 
Rosenfeld, 1992; Allen & Iocono, 1997). This level of accuracy is comparable, 
however, to that attained using skin conductance measurement (see, e.g., MacLaren, 
2001, for review).
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1.2.2.5 The polygraph
The most successful attempt to detect deception to date is the polygraph 
(OTA, 1983; NRC, 2003). The polygraph is employed by thousands of practitioners 
across the world, to address the issue of deception in numerous fields and 
applications (Lykken, 1981). In the United States, the CIA uses the polygraph to test 
employees, applicants, and assets (sources of intelligence) (Sullivan, 2007).
American police departments use it to develop leads in criminal investigations, and 
to test suspects. Since its development over a century ago, the polygraph has become 
a household word, and a commonly used tool.
Like other methods, the polygraph relies upon the assumption that 
physiological arousal reliably accompanies attempts at deception (BPS, 2004; NRC, 
2003). The polygraph measures physiological arousal through several independent 
measurements (e.g. skin conductance, heart rate, respiration). These changes are 
thought to accompany attempts to deceive on the part of subjects being tested. When 
a person answers a question deceptively, they exhibit an increase in these 
physiological indicators that is measured and displayed by the polygraph device. 
Given the right situation and a competent tester, these measurements can supposedly 
indicate when a subject is answering deceptively on a particular question of interest.
Vj I le t JJ 1C  I J.
Figure 1-1: Portable polygraph device, with connectors.
Studies have found the accuracy o f the polygraph to range from 61% to 82% 
(Office o f Technology Assessment (OTA), 1983; see Kircher, Howlitze, & Raskin, 
1988 for meta-analysis). Given the potential personal and social consequences o f the 
polygraph’s applications, this is a very low accuracy rate. These failings have lead 
critics o f the polygraph to argue that there is no direct method available o f measuring 
deception (Saxe, 1985; NRC, 2003). The physiological indicators, they argue, are 
not specifically responses to deception, but rather to any number o f stimuli- such as 
fear o f detection, or nervousness regarding other matters. The non-specific nature of 
the response makes interpreting these measurements as deception problematic, and 
potentially dangerous (OTA, 1983; NRC, 2003). The connection between the 
physiological arousal measured and the deception inferred has been one o f the 
primary problems faced by the polygraph (OTA, 1983). We will turn next to this 
connection.
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1.2.3 Theories for physiological arousal
All of the above mentioned technologies and techniques for detecting 
deception have relied on the same underlying observation: deception appears to be 
accompanied by increased physiological arousal. From measures of autonomic 
arousal to voice stress analysis, the underlying premise of these methods is that 
deception will be accompanied by increased activation of the sympathetic nervous 
system. The most successful of these techniques is the polygraph, simply because it 
is the most accurate measure of such arousal- relying on several different indices.
The one exception to this rule is perhaps the newer methods based on the 
measurement of brain function, the limitations of which were discussed earlier.
One thing shared by nearly every previous method of lie detection, besides 
reliance upon physiological arousal, is an apparent disinterest in why physiological 
arousal should accompany deception in the first place. Very little research has gone 
into explaining the connection between instances of deception and increased arousal. 
There is agreement in the literature that it seems unlikely that there is a specific 
physiological “lie response” (Podlesny and Raskin, 1977). A couple of distinct 
theories can be distinguished for why deception elicits physiological responses.
1.2.3.1 ‘Fear of detection’ theory
Perhaps the most commonly held theory today for the arousal exhibited 
during deception is what has been called the ‘fear of detection’ theory (OTA, 1983). 
This theory holds that it is not the deception, per se, that causes physiological 
arousal, but rather the person’s fear that they will be detected and punished. This 
theory makes a great deal of sense, and explains most of the factors that have been 
found to influence the accuracy of the polygraph (see below). However, there is the 
difficulty that this theory explains the physiological arousal by reference to an 
internal event (fear), which can only be inferred from the subject’s behavior and 
situation. What is really pointed to in this theory, it seems fair to assume, is the 
current situation and how it elicits the fear that a subject’s deception will be detected. 
As will be seen below, the more apparent the situation makes it that one is about to 
be caught being deceptive, the stronger their responses to their own deception.
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This is only a portion of the explanation, however. Even postulating an 
intermediate event, “fear”, provides only a partial explanation of what is causing the 
physiological arousal. Certainly, to get to the point where a person can “fear” being 
detected in a given situation, things must have happened in the past for them to learn 
that the given situation is likely to end in their getting caught and punished. The real 
explanation must lay in the past conditioning that produces the “fear” and the 
physiological arousal when a person is deceptive.
1.2.3.2 Conditioned response theory
The fear of detection theory points to the current environment of the 
individual as the cause of the physiological arousal they exhibit, which is certainly 
very important in explaining the responses measured (see below for a discussion of 
the situational variables involved). The question still remains, however, as to how 
subjects come to exhibit these responses in these sorts of situations. One possibility, 
proposed by Skinner in 1953, is that the past environment of the subject conditions 
the responses measured by the polygraph. Deception is usually punished in our 
society, when detected (Wang & Leung, 2010). It is, on this theory, this past 
punishment for deception that causes it to elicit physiological arousal. This 
explanation has the benefit of pointing to the past of the individual for the original 
explanation of the responses observed. Whereas the ‘fear or detection’ theory above 
simply points to the individual’s current environment, Skinner’s explanation points 
to the current environment and the past environments of the individual in which they 
have been deceptive and punished. The polygraph, on this theory, measures a 
conditioned response similar to other conditioned responses (Skinner, 1953).
Understanding the response measured by the polygraph, it follows, requires 
looking not only at the situations in which this response is strongest when a person is 
deceptive, but previous situations in which they have been deceptive and the 
consequences that have followed. The next section will explore some of the 
situational factors that have been found to cause strong responses to one’s own 
deception.
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1.3 Situational factors effecting the polygraph’s accuracy
To understand the above theories of why people exhibit physiological arousal 
when they are deceptive, it is instructive to examine some of the situational variables 
that have been found to influence this arousal. These situational variables, which can 
be categorized as the consequences and the probability of being detected, strongly 
support the ‘fear of detection’ theory, and in fact many of the studies cited had the 
goal of testing this theory. As will be seen, however, will show that for these factors 
to have an influence, the subject must first learn the types of situations in which their 
deception is likely be detected, and the types of situations in which being detected is 
likely to have severe consequences.
1.3.1 Consequences of detection
The primary factor influencing the accuracy of the polygraph is the potential 
consequences of the subject’s deception being detected (OTA, 1983). Several 
studies have demonstrated that increasing a subject’s motivation to successfully 
deceive makes them more easily detected when deceptive (Bradley & Warfield,
1984; Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1989; Gustafson & Ome, 1963; Kircher, Howlitze, & 
Raskin, 1988;). For example, Gustafson & Ome (1963) found that deceptive 
answers were more easily detected in subjects that were instructed to try to 
successfully deceive than in subjects who received no such instmctions. Bradley & 
Warfield (1984) found that subjects with greater monetary incentive to deceive were 
more detectable. Bradley & Janisse (1981) threatened subjects with an electrical 
shock that would be “painful, but not permanently damaging” if they failed to beat 
the lie detection test, finding that this made subjects more detectable.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for the effect of consequences comes from 
comparison of the accuracy rates of polygraph tests in laboratory settings (in which 
subjects have relatively little motivation to deceive successfully), and criminal 
investigations (in which detection could mean prosecution and incarceration) (Vrij, 
2008). The OTA’s review of studies in the two areas found that the percentage of 
subjects correctly identified as deceptive or truthful in laboratory experiments (61%) 
was more than 20% lower that the percentage of crime suspects correctly identified 
(82%) (OTA, 1983; see Kircher, Howlitze, & Raskin, 1988 for meta-analysis). Thus,
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the greater the consequences for being caught being deceptive, the greater the 
physiological arousal a subject will exhibit during deception.
This overlaps strongly with the ‘fear of detection’ theory, which would 
predict that situations that make a person more scared of being caught, or motivated 
to deceive effectively, increase the arousal they exhibit when being deceptive. By 
associating the physiological arousal a person exhibits when deceptive with the 
probability of punishment in the given situation, this evidence also supports the 
conditioned response theory. The more similar the current situation to previous 
situations in which punishment has been received, the more likely that the 
punishment received in those situations will cause the subject to exhibit 
physiological arousal. The data support both theories, but for different reasons. The 
‘fear of detection’ theory is supported because it points to future likelihood of 
punishment, and the conditioned response theory because it points to the probability 
of past punishment.
1.3.2 Subject’s belief that the test is accurate
The second main factor influencing the accuracy of the polygraph is the 
subject’s belief that the test will accurately detect their deception. Numerous 
laboratory tests have investigated subject’s “belief in the machine.” For example, an 
experiment by Bradley and Janisse (1981) investigating the effect of staged pre-test 
accuracy demonstrations of the lie detector (“stimulation tests”) found that the more 
accurate subject’s were led to believe the test was, the more detectable their 
deception on the subsequent test was (Bradley & Janisse, 1981). The more effective 
the apparatus seemed to be, they found, the more that innocent subjects scored as 
non-deceptive, and the more guilty subjects scored as deceptive. Waid et al. (1979) 
showed that subjects who were tricked into believing the polygraph machine was 
switched off prior to the examination had significantly lower responses to relevant 
questions, and not to control questions.
This relates to the theories described above in much the same way as likely 
consequences of detection. By relating the likelihood of being caught to the 
magnitude of the responses acquired, it supports the notion that the more subject’s 
are afraid that they will be caught, and hence punished, the greater their responses.
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The conditioned response theory, as before, would point to the similarity of the 
current situation to previous situations in which deception has been detected.
1.3.3 Situational factors and punishment
As can be seen, both of these situational factors are directly related with 
punishment. The first relates to the likely magnitude of the punishment that will 
follow the given situation, and the second relates to the probability that punishment 
will be forthcoming in the given situation. This is in line with the ‘fear of detection’ 
theory discussed earlier, as it describes the situations in which punishment is likely to 
occur and to be severe, and claims that a subject’s fear is a function of these 
variables. A better explanation should point to how the individual comes to have 
such a response in situations where they are likely to receive relatively severe 
punishment. How does the individual come to fear detection, and come to fear 
punishment? To understand this, we must look at the basic process by which 
punishment changes behavior.
1.4 Behavioral principles and their relation to deception
The present thesis draws heavily on research into basic behavioral processes 
demonstrated in animals and humans in the laboratory. This section will discuss 
some of the behavioral processes that are pertinent to the research in this thesis.
1.4.1 Classical Conditioning
Classical conditioning is a behavioral phenomenon first demonstrated by Ivan 
Pavlov in his research with dogs. Pavlov discovered that his dogs, which tended to 
salivate when they were presented with their food at feeding time, soon began 
salivating when presented with other stimuli that were associated with feeding time, 
such as him walking into their room. This process, which he went on to study in 
detail, became known as classical, or Pavlovian, conditioning. When a stimulus that 
tends to elicit a response (an unconditioned stimulus or UCS) is repeatedly presented 
shortly after, or “paired,” with a previously neutral stimulus (the conditioned 
stimulus or CS), the conditioned stimulus can come to elicit responses similar to 
those of the unconditioned stimulus (there are instances where the CR is not directly
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related to the UCR, but these instances will not be used in the present thesis). This 
new response is called a conditioned response, or CR. The acquisition of 
conditioned responses is highly dependent upon many factors, such as the time 
between the CS and the UCS, the number of pairings, previous exposure to the CS, 
and numerous others (Pavlov, 1927). Classical conditioning is seen in many aspects 
of behavior, and often results as an accidental by-product of other conditioning 
processes, as we will see with punishment.
1.4.2 Punishment
When a stimulus immediately follows a behavioral response, and the future 
probability of that response is decreased, this stimulus is defined as a punisher, and 
the overall event is called punishment (Hake & Azrin, 1965). Another effect of this 
process is that stimuli associated with the punisher come to elicit conditioned 
emotional responses on future presentations. Watson & Rayner (1920) demonstrated 
this in the Little Albert experiment. When the authors paired a rat with a loud noise, 
not only did Little Albert have an initial emotional response to the loud noise, but 
also upon later presentations of the rat similar emotional responses were elicited 
(conditioned responses). These conditioned emotional responses can be heavily 
context specific (Hall & Honey, 1990). Following strong punishment in a particular 
situation, an organism will exhibit physiological arousal when presented with the 
situation again (Brown & Wagner, 1964). According to Skinner, it is this 
conditioned physiological arousal that is measured by the polygraph (Skinner, 1957).
As a general rule, deception is typically punished in our society. From an 
early age, the child caught lying to their parents is likely to be reprimanded or 
punished in some manner. This holds true through adulthood, those we deceive are 
typically “irritated” at this behavior, and likely will rebuke it if it is caught (Wang & 
Leung, 2010). Within this general rule, however, there are important exceptions 
having to do with the nature of deception as a behavior.
1.4.3 Multiple causation of conditioned responses to deception
This explanation holds that the physiological arousal exhibited during 
deception is a classically conditioned response based on previous punishment 
following deception and the situations in which it occurs. The social situations
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surrounding deception are complicated, however. The conditioning that a person has 
received in their past regarding deception is complicated and extensive. In the first 
place, not every instance of deception is punished. By its very nature, deception is 
difficult to detect, and typically acquires its reinforcing properties directly from this 
fact. This creates an incredibly complex set of contingencies surrounding the 
relation between deception and punishment. Any situational variables paired with 
instances of deception that are detected should tend to increase the subsequent 
conditioned emotional responses exhibited during deception in the presence of these 
variables. Alternatively, situational variables paired with instances of deception that 
are not detected will likely not elicit strong emotional responses when deception 
subsequently occurs in their presence. This section will attempt to cover some of the 
complex ways in which different situations may come to control the responses that a 
person exhibits to their own deception.
1.4.4 Intermittent nature of deception’s consequences
Perhaps the most obvious property of deception as a conditioned stimulus is 
that deception is only punished when it is caught. “Successful” deception goes 
undetected, and hence unpunished. The intermittent pairing of deception with 
punishment will have an effect on the situations that will elicit a conditioned 
response to deception. Properties of the situations in which deception has escaped 
detection will not be paired with punishment, and hence undergo extinction, later 
eliciting smaller physiological responses. Situations in which deception has been 
more consistently detected, however, will more likely have been paired with 
punishment and elicit stronger responses. This helps to explain why a person 
exhibits stronger responses in situations where their deception is more likely to be 
detected.
In addition to this, deception is emitted in situations ranging from relatively 
trivial, to relatively important. As such, the magnitude of potential punishment 
paired with each stimulus surrounding deception varies. Some stimuli in the 
environment (such as an authority figure being present) will likely have been paired 
with far worse consequences than situations where such stimuli were not present. 
The presence and absence of these stimuli combine with stimuli indicating the
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probability of detection, causing overlaps and complex multiple causation of the 
conditioned responses exhibited during deception.
Some examples of these complex instances of causation where a higher 
physiological arousal is likely to be exhibited are (A indicates that present stimuli are 
more likely to have been paired with deception that was detected; B indicates that 
stimuli present are more likely to have been present in high-punishment situations):
- Situations in which one is questioned by an authority figure. [A + B]
- Being told that there is evidence that one is being deceptive. [A]
- The presence of evidence contradicting what one is saying. [A]
- A disapproving look, or an awkward silence, when one is hiding 
something. [A]
Some examples of situations where a lower physiological arousal are likely to 
be exhibited are:
- Deception regarding relatively trivial matters (“white lies”). [5]
- Deception in the presence of a person that has not previously tended to 
punish (or “catch”) instances of deception, or, by generalization, around 
someone that “could not know” that one is being deceptive. [A]
- Deception that will not have immediate consequences, for example via 
email or post. [A + B]
This strong situational contingency of the response to deception may be the 
reason the polygraph gets such inconsistent results. As such, it is not likely that 
reliance upon the unmodified responses a person has to their deception will ever 
provide a reliable means to detecting their deception. The past conditioning is highly 
variable, and the responses it creates reflect this. To acquire more controlled results, 
the conditioning surrounding deception needs to be controlled. By controlling the 
conditioning surrounding deception in the laboratory, it is believed that more 
consistent responses can be acquired during actual testing of deception.
1.5 Overview of Thesis
The aim of the current thesis is to examine deception as a conditioned 
stimulus based on past punishment. This will primarily include conditioning
17
Chapter 1
experiments in which deception serves as the conditioned stimulus. Other 
experiments will investigate whether punishment in a person’s natural environment 
influences their physiological arousal, whether components of deception (e.g. the 
truth-value of statements) can serve as conditioned stimuli, and whether other types 
of response can be conditioned to verbal stimuli related to deception. Together, 
these experiments will investigate the overall process by which deception comes to 
serve as a conditioned stimulus to the physiological arousal measured by the 
polygraph.
Given that a primary premise of this research is that previous punishment in a 
person’s conditioning history for forms of verbal behavior leaves a tendency to 
exhibit physiological arousal when engaging in those forms of behavior, the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 3) will explore the physiological arousal exhibited during 
a form a behavior commonly punished in our society: swearing. This chapter will 
hopefully help to establish the connection between broader conditioning in a 
person’s history of verbal behavior and a tendency to exhibit arousal when engaging 
in that behavior in a controlled setting.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) will examine conditioning 
responses to verbal behavior related to deception in a controlled setting. The truth- 
value of statements will serve as the conditioned stimuli. Rather than using 
physiological arousal, which presumably already has developed conditioned 
responses, this chapter will use a conditioned response that is neutral with relation to 
truth-value: eyeblink responses.
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) will expand on the second by using 
skin conductance as the conditioned response, and examine the conditioning of 
responses to truth-value and deceptive statements.
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 6) will take what was learned in the 
previous chapter, and expand on it by conditioning a skin conductance response to 
instances of deception in an internally consistent context. Specifically, subjects will 
be truthful and deceptive regarding a Cluedo-type scenario, and their responses will 
be differentially conditioned during the experiment.
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Technical Chapter
2.1 Experim ent overview for thesis
The experiments in this thesis required a complex interaction o f hardware and 
software. This is primarily because, while measuring a subject’s physiological 
responses, the program running the experiment also needed to present various stimuli 
that were synchronized with the measurements. This required a relatively 
complicated software program to accomplish. A software development program 
called LabView was selected for creating this software. The way in which this was 
done for the chapters included in this thesis will be outlined in this chapter, to avoid 
repetition in later chapters.
2.2 Experim ent Room
All experiments in this thesis were conducted in a small, quiet room with no 
windows. This room contained two computers situated such that the participant 
could see the screen o f one, but not the other (see Figure 2-1). One o f these 
computers was used to present subject's with tasks, and the other to record their 
physiological responses. It would have interfered with the experiment had subjects 
been able to see their own physiological measurements. During the experiments, the 
experimenter would generally sit in the room for the first few trials o f the experiment 
and monitor the recording o f the subject's skin conductance or eyeblink responses, to 
ensure that the measurements were done correctly. Following this, the experimenter 
left the room, as their presence could interfere with the subject’s skin conductance.
Experimenter
Chair
Participant
Chair
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Figure 2-1: Outline of experiment room used throughout the thesis, with 
door at left.
2.3 Hardware
2.3.1 Computers
One computer in the laboratory was used to measure subjects’ physiological 
responses (Eyeblink in Chapter 3; skin conductance in Chapters 2, 4, and 5). The 
other computer presented subjects with tasks and stimuli, acquired their input when 
necessary, and controlled the runtime of experiment programs. The computers were 
networked together via their serial ports to allow the synchronization of trial events 
in execution and measurement. Lab View programs on each computer were then able 
to share the status and manipulation of variables between the computers.
2.3.2 Skin conductance measurement
The experiments in Chapters 2, 4, and 5 measured participant’s skin 
conductance responses using ADInstruments® PowerLab 2/25 data acquisition 
system (ML825), which converted analogical signals to digital signals by means of a 
16-bit A/D converter. Skin conductance was measured with an ADInstruments® 
model ML116 GSR Amp and MLT116F Finger Electrodes attached to the palmer 
surface of the intermediate phalanges of the first and third fingers of the non­
dominant hand. Participants were instructed in each experiment to rest this hand on 
the table, and to refrain from talking and moving their hand during the test to avoid 
interfering with the measurement. The SCR data was recorded by ADInstruments 
Chart 5.2 software, and was sampled continuously at lk/sec. throughout the 
experiment. This is a common setup for skin conductance experiments.
2.3.3 Electric stimulator
For the purposes of conditioning skin conductance responses, Chapters 5 and 
6 of the present thesis employed electrical stimuli to serve as the unconditioned 
stimuli. These stimuli were presented from ADInstruments® Stimulus Isolator 
(ML 180), and delivered via electrodes attached to the participant’s inner lower 
dominant arm. The shock intensity was individually adjusted for each participant by
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using a shock workup procedure that went as follows: The shock intensity was set to 
a level below the threshold where the subject could feel it, and then increased in 
steps of 0.1 mA. At each step, the subject was asked how the shock was compared to 
the last one, and if they were comfortable increasing it. This process was repeated 
until the highest intensity the subject was comfortable with was found. The range of 
final values used was from roughly 2 mA to 8 mA, with most subjects being at 
roughly 4 mA. These shocks were never painful, and were described by subjects as 
“irritating” or strange feeling. This type of setup has been used before, and the 
equipment employed was designed for these types of experiments and procedures.
2.3.4 Eyeblink conditioning system
Chapter 4 examined eyeblink conditioning. The participant’s eyeblink 
response was conditioned and recorded using San Diego Instruments Eyeblink 
Conditioning System® hardware. This system measures subject’s eyelid activity 
using an infrared emitter/receiver pair positioned in front of their right eye. Since the 
eye absorbs light, the amount of closure of the eyelid can be monitored by bouncing 
infrared light off the eye, with the amount light bounced back being proportional to 
the occlusion of the eyelid over the eye. The system comes with an airpuff delivery 
unit that delivers airpuffs to the right eye. The airpuffs used were 11 psi. The 
airpuffs were not painful, but could be considered slightly annoying. The delivery of 
the airpuff produced a small sound, which occurred at exactly the same time as the 
airpuff.
2.4 Software
2.4.1 LabView
Given the complexity of the hardware interaction required for these 
experiments, a program called LabView was employed for developing the 
experiment programs (see Figure 2). LabView is graphical development 
environment developed by National Instruments (www.ni.com), used primarily in 
engineering and other technical fields (Travis & Kring, 2007). It is used extensively 
for data acquisition and hardware control, but apparently has rarely been adapted for 
the purposes of psychological testing.
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Figure 2-2: Screenshot of LabView visual program m ing environment.
The LabView program written for the experiments used a state-machine 
design to control the flow o f the experiment. This means that each frame o f the 
program waited for a specific event, before moving on to another stage, or state. 
These events were often simply the timing out o f a timer, as in inter-trial intervals. 
Other times, external events such as the subject's keystroke triggered the program. In 
this manner, the experiment program timed and executed trial events.
For the basic experiment trial setup, the program did the following (this is an 
example trial from Chapter 5, Experiment 1):
- Begin trial
- Wait 3 seconds for baseline SCR reading
- Present a statement on the screen- send signal to Powerlab to mark event on 
chart
- Wait for subject to respond to statement by pressing ‘z ’ if it is false, ‘c* if it 
is true
- Send signal to Powerlab to mark answer time and type on chart
- Calculate whether subject’s answer was truthful or deceptive by comparing 
answer to truth-value o f statement
- Wait for 3 second CS-UCS interval
- If statement was deceptive, send signal to Powerlab to deliver shock and 
mark event on chart
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- Wait for randomized inter-trial interval o f between 10 and 12 seconds 
before beginning next trail.
In that particular experiment, this process was repeated for each trial in the 
experiment. In other experiments, such as the Cluedo experiments (Chapter 6), 
modified versions o f this were used, but with the same basic format. The program 
had to compare the presented card with the murderer card, and then the subjects 
answer to determine whether the subject was telling the truth or being deceptive (see 
Chapter 6 for details). Further details o f how the program executed each experiment 
will be explained in later chapters.
2.4.2 C hart
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Figure 2-3: Screenshot of C hart software used for recording and
analyzing skin conductance measurements
Skin conductance responses were measured and recorded using the program 
Chart 5.5 by ADInstruments (Figure 2-3). This program reads the digitalized signals 
from the Powerlab channels and stores them to the com puter's hard-drive. It also 
allows subsequent analysis o f these measurements.
To synchronize the measurements taken with trial events that occurred on the
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program computer, a hardware/software workaround was used, in which program 
computer’s parallel port was used to send signals to the digital input of the Powerlab 
signal. Each trial event was given a distinct digital signal, and a macro1 for Chart 
continuously polled the Powerlab digital input, and upon receiving one of these 
signals marked the appropriate trial event on the chart.
2.4.3 Subject data storage
Subject data were stored on the computers in the laboratory, which remained 
locked when not in use. For analysis, the data was moved to the personal computer 
in the experimenter’s office, where response scoring and statistical analysis were 
conducted. The data remained anonymous and secure throughout the entire process. 
All experiments in this thesis were conducted in accordance with Swansea 
University Psychology department ethical guidelines, and after acceptance of the 
ethical committee’s approval.
1 Special thanks to Gary Freegard, Technician in the Swansea University Psychology 
Department for writing this macro.
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Chapter 3 
Previous Social Punishment and Skin 
Conductance Responses
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3.1 General Introduction
A primary premise of the current thesis is that the punishment in a person’s 
previous conditioning history leaves a tendency to exhibit physiological arousal 
during certain verbal behaviors, and in the situations in which they occur (see 
Chapter 1). It is this arousal that is then measured by the polygraph (NRC, 2003; 
OTA, 1983). It is important to demonstrate this connection between punishment and 
physiological arousal, as this will then provide a basis on which to better understand 
and potentially improve the results of the polygraph. The current chapter explores 
the connection between physiological arousal and past punishment of verbal 
behaviors.
There are certain types of verbal behavior that are likely to have been 
punished in the past conditioning of the individual. An example of this is swear, or 
taboo, words (Jay et al., 2006). Although there is nothing inherently harmful in the 
speaking or hearing of swear words, cultural, historical and social contingencies 
(e.g., being spoken by lower classes), have caused them to become undesirable in 
certain social circumstances (Jay & Janschewitz, 2008). As such, parents and other 
figures of relative authority often punish the use of these words (Jay et al., 2006).
The typical child will receive some form of punishment, ranging from the mild to 
severe, for the use of words such as “fuck” in the wrong company. As such, it would 
be expected that this punishment would leave a tendency for swear words to elicit 
increased physiological arousal- making them a good opportunity to test this 
hypothesis.
Studies have also shown that taboo words, such as swear words, elicit 
stronger skin conductance responses than neutral words (Dinn & Harris, 2000; Gray, 
Hughes, & Schneider, 1982). Harris et al. (2003) tested the SCR exhibited by 
multilingual participants to taboo words presented visually and auditory in their 
primary and secondary languages, finding higher responses to taboo words in 
participants’ native language, than in their secondary language. This makes sense in 
the context of the view articulated in Chapter 1, considering that a person is likely to 
have been exposed to far more punishing contingencies in their primary language 
than in other languages learned, especially in early childhood (Schrauf, 2000). 
Indeed, historically the physiological arousal caused by swearing was explained by 
punishment received in childhood via one’s parents (Ferenczi, 1916; Harris et al.,
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2003). It should be noted, however, that a person is likely also to be exposed to other 
sources of punishment during their social conditioning, such as from friends, 
colleagues at work, and other social encounters where verbal behaviors that are 
appropriate in one context become inappropriate.
Physiological arousal is not only caused by swear words, but can also be 
stimulated by other words that a person encounters or speaks. For example, 
emotional reactions can be caused by words associated with negative events (e.g. 
illness, death, misfortune; see Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989; Wischner & Gladis, 
1969). It is not likely that such words have acquired their arousal effect because of 
direct punishment for their usage, but rather because they tend to be used in 
situations with an increased probability of aversive events. When one uses the word 
“cancer”, for example, it is more likely that they are discussing a traumatic event in 
their life than when they use the word “duck.” Given their tendency to elicit 
emotional arousal, and their lack of a direct punishment history, non-taboo emotional 
words provide a good opportunity to compare the effect of directly punished words 
to emotional words without a direct punishment history.
The present studies, therefore, compared words that have likely been 
previously punished (swear words) with emotional and matched words, examining 
whether previous punishment for saying particular words increases physiological 
arousal when speaking those words, as suggested above. This was done by creating 
four lists of words: one list containing words that are typically punished in everyday 
life (swear words); a list of words with high emotionality; a list of words that are 
matched for frequency and length; and a list of simple filler words to break up the 
trials (Experiment 1). Subject’s skin conductance was measured while saying these 
words aloud, to see if the words more likely to have been previously punished 
elicited stronger physiological arousal than the other words (Experiment 2). Finally, 
these measurements were related to subjects scores on questionnaires used to 
measure subjects’ previous punishment for swearing, and swearing frequency to see 
if this punishment effected their arousal when saying the swear words (Experiment 
3). It was expected that higher previous punishment for swearing would cause 
higher skin conductance responses when swearing.
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3.2 Experiment 1
The first experiment in this chapter focused on developing lists of swear-, 
emotional-, and matched-words, which participants could rate on their offensiveness 
and emotionality. These words would then be used in Experiment 2 to test subject’s 
skin conductance when saying them aloud. Additionally, subjects’ ratings gave the 
opportunity to compare the words to subjects’ previous punishment for swearing and 
frequency of swearing, as measured using questionnaires. It was anticipated that 
subjects who had been more strongly punished for swearing would rate swear words 
as more offensive than subjects with less punishment for swearing.
3.2.1 Method
3.2.1.1 Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate psychology students were used in this study (24 
female and 2 male). The participants had a mean age of 19.9 (±1.7) years. The 
participants were recruited through the Psychology Department’s online participant 
pool, and received course credits for participation in the experiment. All participants 
provided informed written consent prior to participating.
3.2.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Subjects were presented with 3 questionnaires. The first two were lists of 
swear words, emotional words, matched words, and filler words. Subjects were 
asked to rate all words on offensiveness (see Appendix B for example), and 
emotionality (see Appendix C for example), using a Likert scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 
(highest). These words were from a list compiled by the authors, which consisted of 
10 swear words (e.g. “shit”), 10 emotional words (e.g. “cancer”), 10 words matched 
for both word length and frequency in common usage, and 20 filler words (see 
Appendix A for a complete list). Each word was between 4 to 12 letters long 
(Overall Mean = 6 ± 2 letters; Swear Word Mean = 6.2 ± 2.9 letters; Emotional 
Word Mean = 6.9 ± 2 letters; Matched Word Mean = 5.9 ± 2.8; Filler Word Mean = 
5.45 + 1 letter). The matched words were matched for spoken frequency to the 
swear words using the spoken word frequency list provided by Leech, et al. (2001). 
For each word in the swear word list, an emotional and matched word of the same
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length (+/- one letter) was selected that had roughly the same spoken frequency in 
the English language (+/- 5%).
The third questionnaire was designed by the experimenters to measure 
participant’s frequency of past swearing and previous history of punishment for 
swearing (see Appendix B). This brief questionnaire asked questions regarding how 
frequently the subject swears each day, and whether they were often punished them 
for swearing (e.g. “Did your parents often punish you for swearing”).
3.2.2 Results
Comparison of offensiveness of swear, emotional, 
and matched words
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Figure 3-1: Participants’ rating of offensiveness for swear words,
emotional words, and matched words.
Figure 3-1 displays the mean subject ratings of offensiveness for swear 
words, emotional words, and matched words. As can be seen, swear words had far 
greater ratings of offensiveness than emotional- and matched words. A one-way 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with word-type as a within- 
subject factor found a significant effect of word type on offensiveness ratings: F(2,
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50) = 209.22, p  < .001 (A rejection criterion o fp <  0.05 was adopted for this, and all 
subsequent, analyses).
As word-type yielded a significant effect, further analyses were conducted to 
compare the specific word types. A series of protected t-tests was performed 
comparing each word type to the others. These tests found a significant difference in 
rated offensiveness between swear and emotional words: t(25) = 8.01, p < .001, and 
swear and matched words: t(25) = 27.63, p < .001. There was also a significant 
difference between emotional and matched words: t(25) = 10.38, p < .001.
Comparison of emotionality of swear, emotional, 
and matched words
4
3.5 □
3
2.5 3  
2
1.5 
1
0.5
0 n
S w e a r  Emot iona l  M a t c h e d
Word-type 
Figure 3-2: Participants’ rating of emotionality for swear words, 
emotional words, and matched words.
Figure 3-2 displays the mean subject ratings o f emotionality for swear words, 
emotional words, and matched words. As can be seen, emotional words had slightly 
greater ratings of emotionality than swear and matched words. A one-way repeated- 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with word-type as a within-subject factor
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found a significant effect of word-type on emotionality rating: F(2, 50) = 125.19, p  
< .001.
As word-type yielded a significant effect on emotionality ratings, further 
analyses were conducted to compare the specific word types. A series of protected t- 
tests was performed comparing each word type to the others. These tests found a 
significant difference in rated emotionality between emotional and swear words: 
t(25) = 3.16,/? < .005, and emotional and matched words: t(25) = 16.03,/? < .001. 
There was also a significant difference between swear and matched words: t(25) = 
13.95,/? <.001.
To analyze the impact of the participant’s answers on the punishment and 
swearing frequency questionnaires on offensiveness and emotionality, subjects were 
divided into two groups, one for high, and one for low, previous punishment; and 
one for high, and one for low, swearing frequency, based on a median split. Subjects 
who scored higher than the overall median score for previous punishment were in the 
High-Punishment group (N = 13, Mean Score ± SD = 8.4 ± 1.0). Subjects who 
scored lower than the median were in the Low-Punishment group (N = 13, Mean 
Score ±SD  = 5.3 ± 1.7).
Comparison of Offensiveness (left) and 
Emotionality (right) rating of swear words for low 
and high frequency groups
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Figure 3-3: Offensiveness (left) and emotionality (right) ratings of swear 
words for participants with high and low punishment questionnaire 
scores.
Figure 3-3 shows the participant’s ratings of offensiveness (left) for high and 
low punishment groups, and ratings of emotionality (right) for high and low 
punishment. As can be seen, the high-punishment subjects rated the swear words 
slightly more offensive than the low-punishment subjects. A matched one-tailed t- 
test comparing offensiveness ratings between high and low punishment groups 
nearly approached finding a significant difference (p > .09). Likewise, a similar test 
for differences in emotionality scores between high and low punishment groups did 
not find a difference ip > .35). Swearing frequency had an even smaller effect on the 
rated offensiveness ip > .10) and emotionality ip > .20) of swear words.
3.2.3 Discussion
The words created for the swearing, emotional, and matched lists clearly 
matched up with offensiveness and emotionality as expected (swear words were 
more offensive than matched words, and emotional words were more emotional than 
matched words). Swear words were clearly more offensive, and less emotional, than 
emotional words. Likewise, emotional words were more emotional, and less 
offensive, than swear words. This provides support that there is a difference between 
these words in offensiveness and emotionality, supporting the use of these lists in the 
next experiments to test physiological arousal.
Relating these ratings to previous punishment, however, was more elusive. 
Subjects’ ratings of offensiveness were not clearly influenced by their previous 
punishment scores on the questionnaires, but this does not rule out this being a power 
issue. Previous punishment, however, did seem to have a marginal effect on 
offensiveness ratings of swear words. It could be that with more sensitive 
questionnaires this effect would become apparent. It could also possibly be that 
previous punishment does play as strong a role as believed in determining how 
offensive a person finds a swear word to be. This makes sense, as it could be that 
contingencies of reinforcement shape how a person answers that question more than 
their direct experience with being punished for using the word. People often report
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things to be more offensive than their other behaviors would suggest. Perhaps this 
reflects, not their direct conditioning with the behavior being discussed, but rather 
their conditioning with answering questions about it. When asked a question, there 
is often an answer more likely to be reinforced by agreement and further 
conversation on the topic than other possible answers (Skinner, 1957, pg. 148). 
Perhaps these sorts of contingencies are more likely to shape the reported 
offensiveness of swear words than previous direct punishment for swearing.
3.3 Experiment 2
The second experiment in this chapter used the words developed for the first 
experiment to test whether subjects had stronger physiological arousal (measured via 
skin conductance) to swear words than to other word types. Given that people are far 
more likely to have been consistently punished in their past for using swear words 
than for using other words of a non-offensive nature, this should cause them to have 
higher physiological arousal when uttering swear words than the other words in our 
list. The studies mentioned above (Dinn & Harris, 2000; Gray, Hughes, &
Schneider, 1982) used taboo words presented on a screen and auditory. Most of the 
punishment received regarding swear words, it seems likely, will be following verbal 
utterances of the word, rather than simply reading, seeing, or hearing the word. 
Accordingly, the second experiment in this chapter measured subjects’ skin 
conductance responses when speaking these words aloud, to test whether swear 
words elicited more physiological arousal than other word types. This extends the 
field, as no other known research has directly tested the spoken capacity of swear 
words to elicit skin conductance responses. It was expected that subjects would 
exhibit stronger skin conductance responses following the swear words than the 
other word types.
3.3.1 Method
3.3.1.1 Participants
The same twenty-six undergraduate psychology students were used in this 
study as in the previous experiment (see Experiment 1 for details). They participated
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in this experiment prior to filling out the questionnaires described in the first 
experiment.
3.3.1.2 Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a small room containing a desk and two 
computers. The computers were organized such that the participants could be seated 
before one computer monitor, on which the stimuli were presented, while unable to 
see the screen of the other computer, which was used to control the experiment.
Acquisition, amplification, and filtering of participants’ SCR were carried out 
by an ADInstruments® PowerLab 2/25 data acquisition system (ML825), which 
converted analogical signals to digital signals by means of a 16-bit A/D converter. 
Skin conductance was measured with an ADInstruments® model ML116 GSR Amp 
and MLT116F Finger Electrodes attached to the palmer surface of the intermediate 
phalanges of the first and third fingers of the non-dominant hand. Participants were 
instructed to rest this hand on the table, and to refrain from talking and moving their 
hand during the test to avoid interfering with the measurement. The SCR data was 
recorded by ADInstruments Chart 5.2 software, and sampled continuously at lk/sec. 
throughout the experiment.
The same list of words used in Experiment 1 was used in this experiment, and 
was randomized prior to the experiment, and presented one at a time over the course 
of the experiment. No word was presented more than once. These words were 
presented on a 27 x 54 mm computer monitor in black text on a white background. 
They were presented in standard font, with letters 15 mm tall.
A program written using the Lab VIEW® programming environment was used 
to present statements on the display computer, time trial events (see Technical 
Chapter for details).
3.3.1.3 Procedure
Each participant received 50 trials during a single 20-minute experiment 
session. At the start of each trial, a word was presented on the screen, and remained 
visible until the participant read the word and pressed the spacebar. Participants 
were asked in the briefing to simply read aloud each word that was presented on the 
screen. During the experiment, an experimenter remained sitting in the room and
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monitored the computer recording the participant’s skin conductance. This 
experimenter interacted with the participant as little as possible, and gave no 
feedback regarding any of the words read aloud. Each trial was followed by a 
random inter-trial interval (ITI) of between 6 and 9 seconds before the next trial 
began, which was made variable to avoid any effect of predictability.
3.3.1.4 Response measures and statistical analysis
Skin conductance responses for each trial were scored as the magnitude (in 
microSiemens) from trough to apex of the first response occurring with an onset 
latency of 1-4 s after the CS-onset (participant’s speaking the word aloud). This is a 
common response window for SCR conditioning studies (e.g., see Purkis & Lipp, 
2001). For between subject analyses, each subject’s SCR on each trial was scaled to 
a maximum of 100.
For statistical analysis, the skin conductance of participants on trials where 
swear words, emotional words, and matched words presented were averaged. 
Statistical analysis was conducted on these averaged results to test for significant 
differences.
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3.3.2 Results
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Figure 3-4: Averaged SCR across participants for swear words, 
emotional words, matched words and Filler words.
Figure 3-4 displays the average SCR across participants for swear words, 
emotional words, matched words, and filler words. As can be seen, there is a larger 
average SCR following swear words than the other types. Emotional words had only 
slightly stronger responses than the matched and filler words.
A repeated-measures ANOVA, with word-type (swear vs. emotional vs. 
matched vs. filler) as a within-subject factor, as between-subject factors was 
conducted on participant’s SCR scores. This ANOVA revealed a statistically 
significant effect of word-type: F(3, 75) = 122.60, p  < .001.
As word-type yielded a significant effect, further analyses were conducted to 
compare the specific word types. A series of protected t-tests was performed 
comparing each word type to the others. These tests found a significant difference 
between swear and emotional words: t(25) = 9.92,p  < .001, swear and matched 
words: t(25) = 12.93,/? < .001, and swear and filler words: t(25) = 14.20,/? < .001. 
Likewise, there was a significant difference between emotional and matched words: 
t(25) = 5.39,/? < .001, and emotional and filler words t(25) = 5.47,/? < .001. There 
was not a significant difference between matched and filler words (/? > .87).
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3.3.3 Discussion
The current study provided evidence that spoken swear words elicit stronger 
physiological arousal than control words matched for spoken frequency and length. 
Given that swear words are more likely to be punished in everyday interactions than 
most other words, this provides support for the hypothesis that commonly punished 
words tend to elicit stronger physiological arousal than non-punished words. We 
also found that emotional words elicit stronger SCR’s than their matched 
counterparts, understandable considering that the usage of emotional words tends to 
be in situations where some sort of negative consequence has an increased 
probability (e.g. the word “cancer” is often used in conversations where there is a 
probability of a fatality, perhaps of a loved one). Swear words, it was found, elicit 
stronger physiological responses than emotional words- consistent with the direct 
punishment hypothesis described above.
3.4 Experiment 3
As Experiment 2 found higher skin conductance responses to swear words 
than the other word types, it was important to follow up and see if past punishment 
for swearing influenced this skin conductance. The third experiment in this chapter 
therefore used the questionnaires mentioned in Experiment 1 to divide subjects into 
high and low groups based on their previous punishment for swearing, in order to see 
if this impacted on their skin conductance following swear words. The same was 
done for swearing frequency.
3.4.1 Method
This experiment employed the same measurements as Experiment 2, and 
analyzed the results based on subjects’ previous punishment and swearing frequency. 
As discussed above, subjects were divided into high and low punishment and high 
and low swearing frequency groups based on a median split. This left a group that 
had previous been punished more for swearing (high-punishment group, N=13), and 
a group that had previously been punished less for swearing (low-punishment group, 
N=13). It also left a group that swore more frequently (high-frequency group, N=13) 
and a group that swore less frequently (low-frequency group, N=13).
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3.4.2 Results
Average SCR to swear words for high and low 
punishment groups (left) and low and high 
swearing frequency groups (right)
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Figure 3-5: Averaged SCR to swear words for high and low punishment
groups (left), and high and low swearing frequency groups (right).
Figure 3-5 shows the average SCR to swear words for subjects after being 
divided into high and low groups for punishment (left side) and swearing frequency 
(right side). There appears to be a slightly higher SCR to swear words in the high 
punishment group than in the low punishment group. A matched one-tailed t-test 
supported this, finding a significant difference between high and low punishment 
groups (t(24) = 1.85,/? < .04). The figure shows no difference, however, in SCR 
between the high and low swearing frequency groups, and neither did a t-test (p > 
.24).
3.4.3 Discussion
The present experiment found that past punishment significantly impacts the 
skin conductance response a person exhibits following saying swear words aloud. 
Skin conductance monitoring found a stronger effect of past punishment than self­
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reported offensiveness ratings of the swear words (Experiment 1), supporting a 
position that direct measurement is more sensitive then reliance upon self-report. 
Swearing frequency, however, did not impact subjects’ skin conductance when 
swearing, as had been expected. This is consistent with the results from the first 
experiment, which also found little effect of swearing frequency. It could be that a 
more direct measurement of swearing frequency in subject’s behavior might have 
yielded better results, as there may have been self-report biases involved.
3.5 General Discussion
Experiment 1 found that swear words are rated as more offensive and less 
emotional than emotional words, and more offensive and more emotional than a list 
of words matched for spoken frequency and length. This experiment did not, 
however, find that previous punishment for swearing had a significant impact upon 
the offensiveness rating of swear words. Given that there was some effect, however, 
this could be because the questionnaire used to measure previous punishment was 
not sensitive enough. Perhaps a more thorough questionnaire with more questions 
would have found a stronger effect. Another possible explanation, however, is that 
previous punishment does not so much effect how offensive we find a swear word to 
be as how much we are taught to report it as being bad.
The results of Experiment 2 support previous findings showing that swear, or 
taboo, words elicit stronger SCR’s than matched words (Dinn & Harris, 2000; Gray, 
Hughes, & Schneider, 1982; Harris et al., 2003), and expand upon them by showing 
this is true when the words are spoken aloud by participants. Perhaps the most 
interesting finding of this study was that swear words elicit stronger physiological 
responses than emotional words. There is evidence that emotional words elicit 
stronger physiological responses than control words (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989; 
Wischner & Gladis, 1969). This is understandable as emotional words tend to be 
spoken and heard in situations where some sort of negative consequence is of a 
particularly high probability. The use of the word “cancer,” for example, tends to be 
used in contexts where a very dangerous and life threatening illness is being 
discussed. The same is true for words such as suicide, murder, rape, etc. While in 
these situations a sort of punishment is implied by the context, swear words have an 
even closer connection to punishment. Namely, the very utterance of a swear word
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is often the context for impending punishment. Punishment is often contingent upon 
the utterance of swear words, meaning that the physiological arousal that speaking 
such words elicits is more directly related to punishment in the individuals history 
than even for emotional words. This is not, of course, always the case. An 
individual currently undergoing a crisis in which a loved one is diagnosed with 
cancer will very likely exhibit a far stronger emotional response to the word cancer 
than to many swear words. It is therefore evident that individual variance will be 
found in this based on the specific contingencies that an individual has been exposed 
to. As a general rule, however, it appears that previous punishment for particular 
patterns of verbal behavior can have a significant effect on the physiological arousal 
exhibited while engaging in them in a controlled setting. Experiment 3 provided 
further support for this assertion, finding that previous punishment for swearing 
significantly increased the skin conductance subjects exhibited when speaking swear 
words aloud. This is an important point, as the remainder of the thesis will be 
dedicated to trying to control the conditioning that creates such conditioned 
responses, and applying this specifically to the responses used by the polygraph to 
detect deception.
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Chapter 4:
Conditioning a discriminatory eyeblink 
response to the truth-value of statements
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4.1 General Introduction
Chapter 3 explored whether verbal behaviors that are more punished in one’s 
social conditioning will elicit stronger skin conductance responses (SCR) than 
similar non-punished verbal behaviors. It provided evidence that the types of words 
more likely to be punished (swear words) elicit stronger skin conductance responses 
than control words (Experiment 2). It also provided evidence that past punishment 
for swearing increases subject’s skin conductance when swearing (Experiment 3). If 
previous punishment in a person’s environment will condition an increased SCR to 
verbal behaviors, it might be possible to actively classically condition a similar 
response in the laboratory. Hence, the present chapter turns towards actively 
conditioning a response to instances of verbal stimuli in a controlled setting. The 
truth-value of statements was chosen as the verbal stimuli for this experiment, as 
truth-value is an important component of what makes a particular verbal response 
deceptive or truthful (Skinner, 1953, pg. 187).
The status of a verbal response as truthful or deceptive depends upon the 
context. If one states that the world is round, this statement is truthful on a round 
world, deceptive on a flat world (assuming the claimant knows the shape of their 
world). Deception, it follows, depends upon the truth-value of the statement being 
uttered. As such, the question arises whether the truth-value of a statement can itself 
serve as a conditioned stimulus.
It therefore seems important to be able to determine if a well-defined, and 
easily measurable response, can be conditioned to an abstract property, or a property 
shared by many stimuli, of a class of stimuli (in this case, their ‘truth value’, or the 
property of ‘truth’ shared by all true statements). There are cases where a 
conditioned response has been associated with ‘categories’ of stimuli (e.g., Vaughan, 
1984), but it is not clear if such responses were attached to some abstract property 
defining the category, or to the physical characteristics of each of the stimuli 
involved (see Macphail, Reilly, & Good, 1992).
There have also been a limited number of studies exploring the conditioning 
of non-verbal responses to the abstract properties of verbal stimuli. Some such 
studies have explored the putative classical conditioning of differential responses to 
‘true’ and ‘false’ verbal statements (e.g., El'kin, 1957; Fleming, Grant, & North, 
1968), and to the “correctness” of presented arithmetic problems (Fleming et al.,
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1968). A summary of this research can be found in Grant (1972; see Chapter 1). 
These studies were mainly interested in exploring the differences between what 
Pavlov called the “second signalling system” (i.e. language), and neutral conditioned 
stimuli. As such, they tended not to focus on the potential of conditioning such 
responses with the aim of using them to determine facts about the individuals past 
(e.g., determining whether participants think a particular statement is false, when 
there is no other way of determining it).
Given the potentially important results that could stem from a demonstration 
that an abstract property of a stimulus class (in this case ‘truth value’) can serve as a 
stimulus in a conditioning experiment, the experiments presented here attempted to 
explore whether a non-verbal response (i.e. an eye-blink) could be brought under the 
control of the abstract property of verbal stimuli (the truth-value of presented 
statements). This was accomplished by repeatedly pairing statements with a 
particular truth-value (such as being false) with an unconditioned stimulus that tends 
to elicit an eyeblink response (corneal airpuff).
4.2 Experiment 4
The first experiment in this chapter attempted to explore whether an eyeblink 
response could be conditioned to the ‘truth value’ of presented statements (i.e. their 
being false). Given that most work has focused on detecting deceptive statements 
through their association with overt responses (see Chapter 1), false statements were 
targeted for conditioning. To this end, a series containing both true and false 
statements was presented, and the false statements were followed by an air puff. In 
this way, a discriminated conditioned response should be established, with 
statements that are false resulting in a clear conditioned response, and those that were 
true resulting in no conditioned response.
4.2.1 Method
4.2.1.1 Participants
Nine undergraduate psychology students were used in this study (7 female). 
The participants had a mean age of 19.6 (± 1.2) years. The participants were 
recruited through the Psychology Department’s online subject pool, and received
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course credits for participation in the experiment. All participants provided informed 
written consent prior to participating. One participant was excluded from the 
analysis because of very abnormal data recordings (probably due to equipment 
malfunction), leaving eight participants for the final analysis.
4.2.1.2 Apparatus
As described in Chapter 2, the experiment was conducted in a small room 
containing a desk and two computers. The computers were organized such that the 
participants could be seated before one computer monitor, on which the stimuli were 
presented, while unable to see the screen of the other computer, which was used to 
control the experiment.
The participant’s eyeblink response was conditioned and recorded using San 
Diego Instruments Eyeblink Conditioning System® hardware. As the software 
included with this system could not be easily adapted to the experimental situation, a 
custom software program was written using Lab VIEW® to present stimuli on the 
display computer, deliver the unconditioned stimulus, and record eyeblink responses 
(as discussed in the Chapter 2).
The conditioned stimuli were short simple true or false statements (e.g.,
“Humans lay eggs”, “Tom are sitting in a chair”) (see Appendix E for complete list). 
Each statement was approximately 3 to 7 words long (Mean ± SD = 4 ± 1 words). 
Fifty different true statements, and 50 different false statements were used for the 
experiment, and a different statement was presented on each trial. These statements 
were presented in the centre of the screen on a 27 x 54 mm computer monitor in 
black text on a white background. The statements were presented in standard font 
with letters 15 mm tall.
The unconditioned stimulus was a comeal air puff, of approximately 11 psi, 
delivered to the participant’s right eye, delivered using the San Diego Instmments 
Eyeblink Airpump Unit that accompanied the above conditioning system.
4.2.1.3 Procedure
Each subject received 100 trials during a single 25-minute experiment 
session, which should be adequate to establish a conditioned eyeblink response 
(Papka & Woodruff-Pak, 1996). At the start of each trial, a statement was presented
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on the screen, and remained visible for 1000 ms. The order in which the statements 
were presented was randomized, and different for each participant. On trials where 
the statement was false (CS+), its offset was followed immediately by the air puff 
(US). On trials where the statement was true, no air puff was presented. Each trial 
was followed by a random inter-trial interval (ITI) o f between 6 and 9 seconds before 
the next trial began.
4.2.1.4 Response measures and statistical analysis
The circuit employed in the San Diego Instruments EBC system outputs a 
signal proportional to the change in eye closure, with positive representing a closing 
movement o f the eyelid. This allowed the standard deviation o f the measured signal 
to be taken as an indicator o f the amount o f activity o f a participant's eyelid over a 
given period. To measure the eye-blink response on each trial, we used the SD o f the 
period between 500ms after statement presentation and when the UCS was presented 
(Figure 4-1). This response window is common in eyeblink conditioning 
experiments (Smith et al, 2005).
Figure 4-1: In Experiment 4, example of trial analysis method, with the 
dark  rectangle indicating duration of CS and the lighter rectangle 
indicating duration of UCS. The shaded area shows the window in which 
conditioned responses were measured.
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To standardise this value for each trial across participants, these 
measurements were normalized for each participant, to a maximum of 100, using the 
maximum measured UCR for each participant, as done by Tracey, et al. (1999). 
While not changing the within subject relative score of each response, this allows 
comparison across subjects. The response for each trial was thus acquired using the 
following equation:
Response = SD(RWc r ) * [ 100 / max( SD(RW u cr)]
where: RWc.r = Period from 500 ms after CS onset to UCS onset 
RWucr = 500 ms period after UCS onset
For statistical analysis, the trials were broken into ten blocks of 10 trials each, 
and the responses measured in all CS+ (false statements), and CS- (truthful 
statements), trials in each block were averaged. A repeated-measures analysis of 
variance was employed to test whether a significant change in eyelid activity had 
occurred over successive trial blocks between CS+ and CS- statements.
4.2.2 Results
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Figure 4-1: Experiment 4 chart of averaged eyeblink responses in each 
training trial block.
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Figure 4-1 displays the mean magnitude of conditioned responding on each 
10-trial training block for CS+ (false) and CS- (true) trials. Inspection of these data 
shows that there came to be more responding to the CS+ than to the CS- 
presentations over the course of conditioning.
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with block and CS as 
factors was conducted on these data. A rejection criterion o fp  < 0.05 was adopted 
for this, and all subsequent, analyses. This ANOVA revealed a statistically 
significant change in eyeblink activity over blocks, F(l,7) = 2.92, and a statistically 
significant interaction of block and CS, ^(1,7) = 2.33. There was not a statistically 
significant main effect for CS,/? > .10. Simple effect analyses revealed that false 
statements were significantly higher than true statements on blocks 2, 4, 7, and 9 
(smallest F(l,7) = 6.52).
4.2.3 Discussion
The current study provided evidence that the abstract truth-value of a 
statement can serve as a conditioned stimulus in an eyeblink conditioning procedure, 
at least when the truth-value is false. This replicates previous demonstrations of such 
an effect (e.g., Fleming, 1968). However, the terminal discrimination acquired was 
less than had been expected. One possible explanation for this is that a 
discriminatory response to the abstract properties of verbal statements requires a 
time-consuming intervening behavior (reading), and the terminal discrimination was 
possibly limited by the relatively short duration of the statement presentations. 
Experiment 5 tested this explanation by using a longer statement duration during the 
procedure, which should allow subjects more time to respond to the statements 
presented.
4.3 Experiment 5
The results from Experiment 4 suggest that the abstract truth-value of a 
statement can serve as a conditioned stimulus. However, the terminal discrimination 
of the response seemed limited, and this could potentially have been due to 
insufficient time to read some of the statements. This may have resulted in poor 
terminal discrimination, and excessive variability in the response. The second
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experiment attempted to attain a more reliable response by increasing the I SI to 2000 
ms, rather than 1000 ms, giving subjects more time to read and respond to the 
statements. In all other respects, this study was the same as Experiment 4.
4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1 Participants
Eight undergraduate psychology students were recruited via the same means 
as in Experiment 4 (7 female). The participants had a mean age of 22 (+ 4) years.
As before, the participants gave informed consent prior to participation.
4.3.1.2 Apparatus and Procedure
The same apparatus was used as that described in Experiment 4. The 
procedure was also exactly the same as in the last experiment, with the exception that 
statements were presented for 2000 ms, as opposed to 1000 ms. As before, 
participants each received 100 training trials, in which false statements were paired 
with the UCS. The analysis employed was the same as in the previous experiment.
4.3.2 Results
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Figure 4-2: Experiment 5 C hart of Averaged Eyeblink Responses in 
each training trial block.
Figure 4-2 displays the mean magnitude of conditioned responding on each 
block of training trials for CS+ and CS- trials. Inspection of the data from the 
training trials shows that there was a strongly discriminated response between true 
and false statements, which was apparent from the first trial block.
A repeated-measures ANOVA (Block x CS) revealed a statistically 
significant main effect of CS, F (l,7 ) = 15.94, but did not find a statistically 
significant main effect of Block, nor an interaction between the two factors (p > .30).
These results indicate that, with the longer CS duration, a discriminated 
response was apparent within the first few trials, and continued throughout the 
course of acquisition. Thus, this study found a strong discriminatory response, 
corroborating what was apparent from Experiment 4, and previously (Fleming,
1968), and it also established a stronger terminal discrimination. Figure 4-3 displays 
the mean response on the final trial block for subjects that received a 1000 ms and 
2000 ms ISI, showing that terminal discrimination was greater for subjects that had a 
longer ISI. A two-way ANOVA (ISI vs. CS) on the final trial-block from these 
subjects did not find any significant effects (p > .37).
u
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  t e r m i n a l  SCR f o r  1 0 0 0  m s  a n d  
2 0 0 0  m s  ISI
1000 ms 2000 ms
T i m e  b e t w e e n  s t a t e m e n t  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  U C S
Figure 4-3: Chart of averaged eyeblink responses in each training trial 
block from experiments 4 and 5.
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4.4 Experiment 6
Experiments 4 and 5 appear to show that a conditioned response can be 
reliably associated with the abstract ‘truth value’ of a statement (at least when that 
truth value was ‘false’). Prior to discussion of the implications of this finding, and 
the potential causes of such a behavioral change as a result of the conditioning 
procedure, the final study attempted to determine if a similar behavioral change 
could be obtained when the truth-value of the statement was ‘true’, as well as when it 
was ‘false’. To this end, some participants were conditioned to true statements, and 
some to false statements.
In addition, the current experiment also attempted to assess the effect of 
introducing a partial reinforcement schedule on the conditioning and maintenance of 
the responding associated with the truth-values of the statements. In part, this 
manipulation was conducted in order to replicate more fully the work of Fleming 
(1968), who used such a partial conditioning procedure, to fully show 
correspondence between the procedures, and strengthen the converging lines of 
evidence that truth-value is a conditionable property of a class of stimuli. Also, this 
manipulation was conducted to indicate if the failure of Experiment 4 to produce a 
strong terminal discrimination was the product of an effect partial schedule (due to 
some stimuli not being fully read, perhaps producing the impression of a partially 
reinforced stimulus class), or to the effect of the CS duration. If it were the latter, 
then the current study should show strong terminal discrimination, and if it were the 
former, then the current study might not show such a strong effect.
4.4.1 Method
4.4.1.1 Participants
Twelve undergraduate psychology students (12 female) were recruited via the 
same means as in the first two experiments. The participants had a mean age of 20.4 
(± 1.0) years, and were recruited as described in Experiment 4.
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4.4.1.2 Apparatus and Procedure
This experiment employed the same apparatus used in the other two 
experiments. The same statements and order were used as in the previous 
experiments. However, whereas in the first two experiments all participants were 
reinforced following false statements, in this experiment half of the participants were 
reinforced following true statements.
As before, each subject received 100 training trials. In the first 50 training 
trials, the UCS was presented on every CS+ trial. In the second 50 trials, the UCS 
was presented on only 50% of the CS+ trials (each CS+ trial had a 50% probability 
of being reinforced, as randomly determined by the program in run-time). The ISI 
was the same as in the second experiment (2000 ms).
The analysis employed was the same as in the previous experiments.
4.4.2 Results
C o n d i t i o n i n g  t r i a l s  f o r  f a l s e  ( l e f t )  a n d  t r u e  ( r i g h t )  
s t a t e m e n t s  a s  t h e  C S  +
60
C ontinuous Ra t i o Ra t io
^  50
T30)
ra
to 40
<u
V)
o 30 a
VI<u
*  20 
c
W
S3<U
>
L U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Trial Block ( x l O  tr ial s )  m
Figure 4-4: Experiment 6 C hart of Averaged Eyeblink Responses for 
false statements as CS+ (left), and true statements as CS+ (right) in each 
trial block of ten trials.
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Figure 4-4 displays the mean magnitude of conditioned responding on each 
block of training trials for CS+ as false statements (left), and as true statements 
(right). As can be seen in the figure, a discriminative response to CS+ develops for 
both groups relatively early in the experiment, and remains throughout the first 50 
trials (continuous reinforcement). These responses seem to drop off over the next 50 
trials (partial reinforcement). A mixed-model repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on all 100 trials with CS (CS+ vs. CS-) and block (10 blocks) as within- 
subject factors, and Group (True vs. False statements reinforced) as a between- 
subject factor. It found a statistically significant main effect of CS (F(l,10) = 6.02, p  
< .035), and a significant effect of Block (F(9,90) = 2.37, p  < .02). There was also 
an interaction between Block and CS (F(9,90) = 2.20,/? < .03). There were no 
interactions with group, however (all p  > .2).
A closer look at just the continuous conditioning trials (first 50 trials for each 
subject), using the same analysis, also found a statistically significant main effect of 
CS (F(l,10) = 8.00,/? < .02), a significant effect ofblock (F(4,40) = 3.38,/? < .02) 
and an interaction between the two (F(4,40) = 3.78,/? < .02). The interaction 
between Block and Group for the continuously reinforced trials just missed 
significance (p > .065). The main interaction of Group, CS, and Block was not 
significant (p > .1).
A closer look at just the ratio conditioning trials (last 50 trials for each 
subject), using the same analysis, found no significant effects.
4.4.3 Discussion
These results from the 100% reinforcement blocks replicate those noted in 
Experiments 4 and 5, and show a clear effect of conditioning, but also finding it 
irrespective of the truth-value of the statement. However, when a partial 
reinforcement schedule was introduced, the discrimination was reduced markedly, 
suggesting that, even with a stimulus duration long enough to produce an effect, a 
partial schedule was not enough to support such a discrimination. This further 
expands on the findings from the previous two experiments, and previous research 
by other authors demonstrating eyeblink conditioning with truth-value (Fleming,
1968).
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4.5 General Discussion
The current series of studies explored whether the abstract property of ‘truth 
value’ among presented statements could be reliably associated with an overt 
response in an eyeblink conditioning procedure. The series of findings suggested 
that such a response could be conditioned. Such conditioning, however, may depend 
upon on the ISI employed in the procedure (Experiment 5). Additionally, truth-value 
can serve as a conditioned stimulus regardless of whether the truth-value conditioned 
is true or false (Experiment 6). These findings corroborate and extend the previous 
reports of such conditioning discussed in the introduction of this chapter (section 4.1; 
see Grant, 1972, for a review). Whereas Experiments 2 and 3 (Chapter 3) 
demonstrated that the previous social conditioning a person has undergone leaves a 
measurable skin conductance response when they engage in verbal behaviors that 
have been previously punished (swearing), the present chapter shows that similar 
conditioning can be accomplished in the laboratory. The truth-value of statements, 
which is strongly related to deception, can apparently be conditioned to serve as a 
conditioned stimulus in an eyeblink conditioning procedure.
The current series of experiments extend these previous reports by showing 
the effect of different ISI’s. For reasons that will be discussed shortly, this property 
of the conditioning contingencies appears to play a vital role in determining the 
properties, and even nature, of the response. As such, this study sheds light on 
previous studies attempting to condition responses to the abstract properties of 
statements (e.g. Fleming, 1968), which used an ISI of around 1900 ms (very close to 
that used in Experiment 5 above). The present study brings attention to new 
variables that may need to be addressed in future experiments in this area.
That the current findings demonstrated that an abstract property of a stimulus 
class could serve as a stimulus in a conditioning experiment raises some questions 
about the nature of this abstract property. In this case, the stimuli that were 
conditioned did not share any physical properties with one another, and this suggests 
that it was, indeed, the abstract truth-value of the stimuli that was conditioned. It is 
unclear whether stimuli classes connected by other arbitrary relationships would be 
similarly impacted by such conditioning, or what the limits to the conditioning of 
arbitrary stimulus properties might be (i.e., would this extent to nonverbal stimuli, or 
extend to non-humans). However, the current study is one of the first to demonstrate
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such an effect, and this does have some implications for the practical detection of 
deception. Further research in this area could perhaps sharpen and improve the 
stimulus control acquired by such abstract properties of verbal statements, even to 
the point of being able to use them to see if a person believes a statement to be true 
when this is otherwise unknown. The demonstrated scope of potential generalization 
may hint at the possibility of generalization crossing the overt/private barrier, as 
done in the polygraph.
A final issue that should be discussed is the nature of the behavioral change 
that resulted from this procedure. Ostensibly, the method used was a classical 
conditioning procedure. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the 
emergent response was in fact operantly controlled. In fact, there is some evidence 
that the latter form of control, rather than the former classical control, may be more 
powerful in these studies. A stronger discriminated response was obtained in 
Experiments 5 and 6, compared to Experiment 4, and there was a conspicuous 
change in the characteristics of the responses and their acquisition in the former 
experiments. In Experiment 4, which used a 1000 ms ISI, there was a typical 
conditioned response pattern, with a small response (CR) following the CS, and a 
larger response (UCR) following the UCS. In Experiments 5 and 6, however, few 
responses followed this specific pattern. In approximately one-third of the 
participants, the presentation of the CS caused them to close their eyes and open 
them following the UCS (a typical avoidance response, as described by Martin,
1969). In other participants, the presentation of the CS caused a rapid blinking of 
eyes. The common characteristic of all these responses, however, was that they did 
not follow the pattern of a classically conditioned response. Rather, they had the 
characteristics of operant avoidance responses (Martin, 1969).
If the responses obtained in the second experiment were operant, this may 
help to explain the failure to acquire significant effects for either block or interaction. 
The responses were acquired too rapidly (within the first 10-20 trials) to exhibit an 
effect over blocks. Such a rapid acquisition would be very unlikely in classically 
conditioned responses (Kimble, 1968). In operant responses however, this could be 
explained as stimulus induction to a strongly pre-conditioned abstract stimulus 
(whether statements are “true” or “false”; Skinner, 1956). It is not the aim here to 
explain the specifics of this process; it will suffice to say that it appears to lie outside 
the area of classical conditioning. As mentioned above, previous studies in this area
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have used CS-UCS intervals roughly equivalent to that used in the second 
experiment, making the present discussion very likely relevant to their findings as 
well. This topic will be returned to as later chapters explore conditioning other 
response types to truth-value (Experiment 8, Chapter 5).
In summary, the Experiment 4 found that using a relatively short 1-second 
ISI, it was possible to condition an eyeblink response to the abstract property of 
“falseness” in unique visually presented statements. The terminal discrimination 
achieved, however, seemed to be hindered by the short ISI not allowing subjects time 
to respond to all statements. In correcting this problem in Experiment 5, with a 
longer ISI, however, it was found that the effect of conditioning is lost, and a 
seemingly operant avoidance response is found. Experiment 6 narrowed the cause of 
this problem by ruling out the possibility that a naturally imposed partial 
reinforcement schedule in the first experiment limited the discrimination developed, 
and established that true as well as false statements could be conditioned. This study 
has revived an important line of inquiry into the use of conditioning to access 
otherwise inaccessible portions of a person’s behavior. Even more so, it has brought 
attention to an important variable (ISI) that may perhaps have been at the root of the 
previous loss of interest in the line of inquiry. As such, the developments of these 
studies is certainly original in making clear the next step for future research: to find a 
method of making the temporal requirements of responding to complex verbal 
stimuli consistent with those of establishing discriminatory conditioned responses. 
For this reason, the next chapter turned to the use of skin conductance conditioning, 
which is a slower response, and can therefore potentially accommodate slower and 
more complex conditioned stimuli.
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Chapter 5
Properties of Deception and Truth-value as 
a Stimulus for a Conditioned Skin Conductance
Response
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5.1 General Introduction
Chapter 4 explored the conditioning of an eyeblink response to the truth- 
value of statements. The findings suggest that truth-value can serve as a conditioned 
stimulus, but that the temporal limitations of eyeblink responses presented 
difficulties when using verbal stimuli. Eyeblink responses are very fast, usually 
having very short inter-stimulus intervals in conditioning (Woodruff-Pak & 
Steinmetz, 2010; Kimble, 1961); whereas verbal stimuli are relatively complex and 
can require more time for responding. As the aim of the present chapter was to 
follow up on Chapter 4 by further examining verbal stimuli and deception as 
conditioned stimuli, the use of skin conductance was employed rather than eyeblink 
responses. Skin conductance is a slower response (Kimble, 1961), allowing 
conditioning with longer and more complex stimuli. Additionally, the use of skin 
conductance response brings us closer to the polygraph, as it is one of the responses 
the polygraph employs (National Research Council, 2003).
As seen in Chapter 1, the polygraph measures changes in various indices of 
arousal of the sympathetic nervous system that purportedly accompany attempted 
deception (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance, etc.) (NRC, 2003). Unfortunately, the 
association between these measured responses and the inferred deception is often 
unreliable and inaccurate, meaning that people often have large responses when 
truthful, and no responses when deceptive (NRC, 2003; see Chapter 1). These 
problems make reliance upon the polygraph perilous (Iacono, 2001; National 
Research Council, 2003; OTA, 1983). This lack of reliability has been a main failing 
of the polygraph, and, indeed, there has been no solid scientific explanation for the 
apparent association between deception and increased arousal it relies upon (OTA, 
1983), making significant improvement of the polygraphs accuracy nearly 
impossible (see National Research Council, 2003).
The most commonly accepted theory that accounts for the emergence of the 
responses that are measured by the polygraph is that a person’s ‘fear of detection’ 
produces an increase in physiological arousal (OTA, 1983; Reid & Inbau, 1966; see 
Chapter 1). As was seen in Chapter 1 (section 1.3), the ‘fear of detection’ theory 
maps very strongly onto the situational factors that have been found to influence the 
accuracy of the polygraph. For example, experiments have demonstrated that the
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accuracy with which a participant’s deception can be detected by the polygraph 
increases when they have greater incentive to deceive successfully (Gustafson & 
Ome, 1963; Kircher, Howlitze, & Raskin, 1988), and when they are more convinced 
that the test will accurately detect their deception (Gustafson & Ome, 1965; Janisse 
& Bradley, 1980; Waid, Ome & Wilson, 1979). Moreover, as noted by Reid and 
Inbau (1966), the polygraph relies upon the manipulation of such variables to 
increase participants’ responses to deception: seasoned polygraphists have admitted 
that, without the use of methods like “stimulation tests”, a pre-test procedure for 
demonstrating the device’s accuracy to the participant (often staged), they cannot 
detect deception with any appreciable accuracy (Reid & Inbau, 1966)).
The ‘fear of detection theory’ does not address, however, how subjects come 
to have a skin conductance response to deception in the first place, or indeed how 
they come to have a ‘fear of detection.’ Certainly a person is not bom “knowing” 
that uttering deceptive statements will be socially punished, or knowing that 
deception in one situation is more likely to be caught and punished than in another 
situation. Hence, there are other variables involved in causing the response in 
question. Such issues are more directly addressed by another theory regarding the 
responses to deception discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2, Chapter 1): the 
conditioned response theory. This theory focuses on the way in which the responses 
measured by the polygraph are originally formed, claiming that they are conditioned 
like other responses (Skinner, 1953). As discussed in Chapter 1, Skinner’s analysis 
of emotional conditioned responses as a side effect of punishment provides a 
reasonable explanation for how such responses could be established in a person’s 
typical conditioning history. Chapter 3 showed how past punishment in a person’s 
experience for a particular behavior can leave a tendency to have increased 
physiological arousal when engaging in that behavior. Deception is typically 
associated with punishment from a very early age (when detected), and the responses 
measured by the polygraph could feasibly be the same sort of effect as was seen with 
swear words.
Given that the ‘fear of detection’ theory focuses on situational factors likely 
to increase the arousal exhibited by subjects when deceptive, and the conditioned 
response theory tends to focus on the past conditioning likely to have caused such 
arousal, one way to possibly tease apart these theories is to condition such arousal in 
a situation devoid of the factors that typically increase the physiological arousal
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accompanying deception. The conditioned response theory provides an objective 
way of re-creating and analyzing such responses in a controlled environment. By 
simply pairing instances of deception with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., a mild 
electric shock), it should be possible to create a conditioned response similar to that 
measured by the polygraph. This re-creation of the response used by the polygraph 
may provide an important step towards understanding its origin and being able to 
improve its properties for practical use in detecting deception. At the same time, 
avoiding the situational variables eluded to by the fear of detection theory can show 
that, despite the fear of detection itself, a response to deception can be established 
that does not necessarily rely on the previous experience of the individual.
Other studies have tested whether deception can serve as a conditioned 
stimulus using other types of responses. For example, Jaffee, Millman, and Gorman 
(1966) purportedly demonstrating the classical conditioning of an eyeblink response 
to instances of verbal deception. In this study, twelve participants were asked a 
series of questions, and told to respond deceptively on half of their answers. For 200 
conditioning trials, deceptive answers were paired with an airpuff (100% CS-UCS 
ratio in first 100 trials, followed by 50% variable ratio in the next 100 trials). 
Following this conditioning stage, the authors attempted to use the participants’ 
eyeblink responses to detect deceptive answers on 20 trials, employing questions 
similar to the conditioning questions, but unique to the participant. The authors were 
able to detect roughly 1/3 of the participants’ deceptive answers in the test phase, 
with a strong indication that most of the error was due to rapid extinction of the 
eyeblink responses between the first and second unreinforced deception in the testing 
phase (Jaffee et al., 1966). While the use of eyeblink conditioning avoids the 
interference of previously acquired skin conductance responses to deception and the 
situational variables mentioned above, the problems seen in Chapter 4 preclude its 
use in the present experiments.
As already seen, laboratory studies tend to acquire less accuracy in polygraph 
tests than field research (section 1.3, Chapter 1). Additionally, mock crime scenes, 
by simulating the contingencies involved in real-life punishable situations, also tend 
to increase accuracy. Accuracy demonstrations of the hardware and motivation to 
deceive successfully also greatly increase the arousal exhibited (see section 1.3, 
Chapter 1 for review of these factors). The present experiments avoided the 
situational variables that the fear of detection theory would predict to increase
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physiological arousal to deception. Relatively uninterested psychology students 
were tested in a laboratory. They were deceptive regarding topics that did not 
concern them personally, and they were not threatened with any sort of social reward 
or punishment for their deception. The similarity between the current experiment 
situation and real-life polygraph tests was minimized.
Experiment 7 attempted to classically condition a discriminative SCR 
response to participants’ deceptive answers regarding whether statements presented 
on a computer monitor were true or false. Skin conductance was chosen as the target 
measure of physiological arousal, as it has been shown to be the most reliable and 
sensitive of the measurements employed by the polygraph (Bell, Kircher &
Bernhardt, 2008). Care was taken to isolate the participant’s deception from all 
aspects of the situation normally surrounding it -  no incentive was given for 
deceiving successfully, and the answers on which participants were deceptive was 
made contingent upon an arbitrary criterion (as described below). Experiment 8 
elaborated on this study, and those in Chapter 4, by further investigating whether the 
simple observed truth or falsity of the statements used in the first experiment could 
serve as a discriminative stimulus. By investigating whether an SCR can be 
conditioned to deception in a controlled setting, the present experiments aimed to test 
Skinner’s explanation of the responses measured by the polygraph, and demonstrate 
a functional relation between these responses and the environmental events purported 
to shape them.
5.2 Experiment 7
The first experiment investigated whether a discriminated SCR can be 
classically conditioned to the deceptiveness of participants’ responses. Participants 
were presented with a series of short statements on a computer monitor, half of 
which were true, and half of which were false. These statements were similar, but 
not identical to those used in Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter 4). The participants 
were instructed to indicate whether each presented statement was true or false via 
key-presses. To induce deception, participants were instructed to respond 
deceptively on half of their answers based on an arbitrary criterion: if the statement 
referred to them personally, or to the room that they were in presently.
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Two groups of participants were used: one in which deceptive answers served 
as the CS+, and one in which truthful answers served as the CS+. All CS+ responses 
were followed by the UCS (a mild electric shock). The extent to which this 
differential reinforcement conditioned a discriminatory SCR was compared in each 
group. This allowed comparison between the effectiveness of deceptive responses 
and truthful responses as conditioned stimuli, which might have both interesting 
theoretical and practical consequences for lie detection. By demonstrating the 
conditioning of an SCR to deception in a controlled environment, in isolation from 
the variables that are usually relied upon by the polygraph for improved accuracy 
(e.g. those alluded to by the ‘fear of detection’ theory), it was hoped that this would 
improve our understanding of the initial causes for the physiological arousal relied 
upon by the polygraph. It was expected that the group in which deception served as 
the conditioned stimulus would develop a strong conditioned response to their own 
deception, and the group in which truthful answers served as the conditioned 
stimulus would develop a somewhat weaker response.
5.2.1 Method
5.2.1.1 Participants
Twenty undergraduate psychology students were used in this study (12 
female). The participants had a mean age of 20.6 (±1.4 SD) years. They were 
recruited through the Psychology Department’s online subject pool, and received 
course credits for participation in the experiment. All participants provided informed 
written consent prior to participating.
5.2.1.2 Apparatus
As discussed in the Chapter 2, the experiment was conducted in a small, quiet 
room containing a desk and two computers. The computers were arranged such that 
the participants could be seated before one computer monitor, on which the stimuli 
were presented, while unable to see the screen of the other computer, which was used 
to control the experiment and record the participant’s SCR.
Acquisition, amplification, and filtering of participants’ SCR were carried out 
by an ADInstruments® PowerLab 2/25 data acquisition system (ML825), which 
converted analogical signals to digital signals by means of a 16-bit A/D converter.
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Skin conductance was measured with an ADInstruments® model ML116 GSR Amp 
and MLT116F Finger Electrodes attached to the palmer surface of the intermediate 
phalanges of the first and third fingers of the non-dominant hand. Participants were 
instructed to rest this hand on the table, and to refrain from talking and moving their 
hand during the test to avoid interfering with the measurement. The SCR data was 
recorded by ADInstruments Chart 5.2 software, and sampled continuously at lk/sec. 
throughout the experiment.
The UCS was a mild electrical shock presented from ADInstruments 
Stimulus Isolator (ML 180), and delivered via adhesive electrodes attached to the 
participant’s inner lower dominant arm. The intensity of this shock was calibrated 
prior to the experiment, based on the participant’s report, to be “unpleasant, but not 
painful.” To accomplish this, a shock workup procedure was used. For each 
participant, the intensity of the shock was initially set far below the threshold at 
which they could feel it. An initial shock was delivered at this setting (1mA), and 
the participant was asked if they could feel it (none reported that they could). 
Following this, the intensity of the shock was increased by .3mA, and another shock 
was delivered. The participant was asked if they could feel this, and if they said no 
the shock was again increased by the same amount. This was repeated until the 
participant reported that they could feel the shock, and they were then asked if the 
shock was “alright” and if they minded going any higher. If they said they didn’t 
mind going higher, the shock was again increased by the same amount. As soon as 
the participant said they preferred not going higher, they were asked if they were 
comfortable at the current level, or if they would rather lower it. The shock intensity 
was therefore set according to their wishes at this point.
The statements were short, simple true or false statements (e.g., “Tow are 
sitting in a chair”; see Appendix E for a complete list), similar to those used in 
Chapter 4. Each statement was between 3 to 7 words long (Mean = 4.0 ± 1.1 words). 
Twenty true and twenty false statements were presented. The statements were 
randomized prior to the experiment, and no statement was presented more than once 
during an experiment session. These statements were presented on a 27 x 54 mm 
computer monitor in black text on a white background. They were presented in 
standard font, with letters 15 mm tall.
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As described in the technical chapter, a program written using the Lab VIEW® 
programming environment was used to present statements on the display computer, 
time trial events, acquire and analyze the participant’s answers, and trigger 
presentation of the UCS.
5.2.1.3 Procedure
Participants were tested individually, and asked not to discuss the experiment 
with other students. Each participant received 40 conditioning trials during a single 
35 min session. The experiment was counterbalanced, with half the participants (10) 
receiving the UCS following deceptive answers, and half (10) following truthful 
answers.
Upon arriving for the study, each participant was seated and given an 
information sheet to read. The information sheet said that they would be receiving 
mild electric shocks during the experiment, but did not give any details regarding 
when the shocks would occur. After reading this, the participant filled out the 
written consent form. The participant was attached to the SCR monitor and the 
shock electrodes. The SCR recording software was software zeroed. The shock 
intensity was individually adjusted as described above in the Apparatus section.
Following this, the participant was given instructions for the experiment.
They were instructed to respond to whether each statement presented on the monitor 
was true or false by pressing the ‘z’ key on the keyboard if it was false, and the ‘c’ 
key if it was true. To ensure they would answer deceptively on half the trials, they 
were told to answer deceptively (by pressing the wrong key) if the statement referred 
to “[them] personally, or to the room [they] were presently in,”- which exactly half 
of the statements in the list did.
At the beginning of each trial, the program paused 5 seconds to provide a 
baseline measurement. Following this the statement was presented on the computer 
monitor, and the program waited for the participant to respond whether the statement 
was true or false. Once the participant responded, the program analyzed whether 
their answer was deceptive or truthful by comparing it to pre-defined truth-values 
assigned to each statement. On reinforced trials, the UCS followed 3 seconds after 
the CS+ (participant’s answer). The trial statement remained visible until 
immediately after the UCS (or equivalent time on non-reinforced trials). No electric
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shocks were delivered on CS- trials. The program was written such that if a 
participant accidentally answered wrongly, this was treated as a deceptive answer. In 
practice, however, this was found to happen rarely, if ever. Each trial was followed 
by a randomized inter-trial interval of between 10 and 12 seconds before the next 
trial began.
5.2.1.4 Response measures and statistical analysis
Skin conductance responses for each trial were scored as the magnitude (in 
microSiemens) from trough to apex of the first response occurring with an onset 
latency of 2-4 seconds after the CS-onset (participant’s keyboard response). This is a 
common response window for SCR conditioning studies (e.g., see Purkis & Lipp, 
2001), with the modification that rather than using start of 1 sec. after the CS-onset, 
as is more common, we chose a start of 2 seconds following the CS-onset to avoid 
the tail end of SCR’s to the previously presented statement.
For statistical analysis, the trials were broken into blocks of 10 trials, and the 
SCR’s for CS+ and CS- trials in each block were separately averaged to produce the 
CS+ and CS- responses for that trial block. Statistical analysis was conducted on 
these blocks to test whether a significant change in SCR’s had occurred over 
successive blocks between CS+ and CS- trials blocks.
5.2.2 Results
Trial Block's for Deceptive (left) and Truthful (right) 
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Figure 5-1: From Experiment 7, chart of averaged SCR’s in each trial 
block for subjects reinforced following deceptive answers (left) and 
truthful answers (right).
Figure 5-1 displays the mean trial block SCR to CS+ and CS- trials for both 
the deception group (in which deception served as the CS+; left panel), and the 
truthful group (in which truthfulness was the CS+; right panel). As can be seen in 
Figure 5-1, for the deception group some discrimination between deceptive and 
truthful answers was apparent from the first trial block. Over the course of training 
trials participants’ responses seem to increase to deceptive answers, while responses 
to truthful answers remain relatively stable. The truthful group appears to develop 
far less discrimination to the CS+ (truthful answers) over the course of training trials. 
By the end of training, there appears to be a strong discrimination apparent for the 
deception group (CS+ = deceptive answers; left panel), but there was little difference 
between CS+ and CS- where truthful responses were the CS+ (right panel).
A mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with group (truthful answers 
reinforced vs. deceptive answers reinforced) as a between-subject factor, and block 
and CS (CS+ vs. CS-) as within-subject factors, was conducted on these data. A 
rejection criterion ofp <  0.05 was adopted for this, and all subsequent, analyses.
This analysis found a statistically significant main effect of CS, F(l,18) = 5.02, 
indicating overall higher SCR’s to CS+ trials. There were no other statistically 
significant main effects or interactions ip > .20).
As the numerical data hinted at a potential difference in the conditioning 
levels depending on whether the CS+ was truthful or deceptive statements, the data 
were further analyzed using a separate two-factor ANOVA’s (CS x block) for each 
group as outlined by Howell (1997). Inspection of the data from the deception group 
(CS+ = deceptive answers) revealed a statistically significant main effect of CS, 
F(l,9) = 9.46, but did not find a statistically significant main effect of block ip >
.60), nor an interaction between the two factors ip > .60). Inspection of the data from 
the truthful group (CS+ = truthful answers) found no significant effects, (all p  > • 15), 
indicating that this group acquired far less discrimination from the conditioning trials 
than did the deceptive group.
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Crosss-Group Comparison of Deception as CS+ and CS- (left), and 
Truthful answers as CS+ and CS- (right)
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Figure 5-2: From Experiment 7, cross-group comparison of SCR’s for 
deceptive responses as CS+ (deception group) and CS- (truthful group) 
(left), and truthful responses as CS+ (truthful group) and CS- (deceptive 
group) (right).
To present the effect that UCS pairings had on participants’ SCR’s to 
deceptive and truthful answers, Figure 5-2 directly compares SCR responses to 
deceptive answers when they served as CS+ (deception group), and as CS- (truthful 
group), in the left panel; and likewise truthful answers as CS+ (truthful group), and 
CS- (deception group), are compared in the right panel. As can be seen in the left 
panel of Figure 5-2, the initial SCR to deception remains relatively stable when not 
paired with the UCS (truthful group), but increases when paired with the UCS 
(deception group). Less discrimination is seen in the SCR to truthful answers, 
however, which does not appear to be heavily influenced by pairing with the UCS. 
This provides support that, while there was clearly an initial SCR to deception, 
pairing it with the UCS did have an effect of strengthening the discriminative SCR to 
deception over the course of the trials.
5.2.3 Discussion
The findings of the current experiment, particularly that deceptive answers 
can be conditioned to serve as a discriminative CS, support the previous findings 
reported by Jaffee et al. (1966). The current findings further expand upon the
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previous data by demonstrating the effect using SCR (as such, avoiding the potential 
interference of ‘voluntary’ responses found in eyeblink conditioning; Kimble, 1961). 
Additionally, the present experiment showed that the results do not apply equally for 
truthful answers.
By demonstrating the re-creation/strengthening of a conditioned SCR to 
deception, these results support Skinner’s (1953) explanation and the conception of 
the physiological arousal accompanying deception as conditioned responses. 
Deception in the abstract, it seems, can serve as a strong CS, in the absence of other 
factors generally relied upon by the polygraph to increase responses to deception. 
This implies that the responses relied upon by the polygraph can be manipulated and 
strengthened in a more direct, and less situation-contingent, manner than has been 
previously possible. This lends support to the conditioned response theory of the 
responses measured by the polygraph, suggesting that these responses can be more 
directly manipulated than the ‘fear of detection’ theory would have us believe. .
5.3 Experiment 8
As discussed in Chapter 4 (see section 4.1, Chapter 4), deception cannot be 
defined by a verbal response alone, but requires taking into account the situation in 
which it occurs. In the first experiment in this chapter, this situation consisted of 
participants’ past conditioning regarding the statements that they were presented with 
(specifically, whether they had been taught to respond towards the statements as true 
or false). The deception of the participant’s answers in Experiment 7 was, therefore, 
defined by their answers, and by the truth-value of the statements to which they were 
answering. Experiment 8 expanded on the results of the first experiment by testing 
whether the simple truth-value of presented statements could serve as a 
discriminative stimulus in a similar procedure. Such a test could have both practical 
and theoretical implications. Practically, it is valuable to establish whether a 
procedure in which participants passively view statements can be used to establish 
whether they believe the statements to be true or false. Theoretically, such a test 
may help to further explain the previous conditioning upon which a conditioned 
response to deception relies. Given that truth-value is an important component to 
what makes a response deceptive, it is important to know if truth-value in itself can 
serve as a conditioned stimulus. To this end, the present experiment was similar to
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the series of experiments described above in that the truth-value of statements served 
as the CS. It differed, however, in that in the present experiment, participants 
passively observed the statements presented in Experiment 7 on a computer screen, 
and the truth-value of the statements served as the CS (half of the statements were 
true and half false). As before, the experiment was counter-balanced, with false 
statements serving as the CS+ in half the participants, and true statements serving as 
the CS+ in the other half. As in the first experiment, the UCS (a mild electric shock) 
was paired with all instances of the CS+.
5.3.1 Method
5.3.1.1 Participants
Sixteen undergraduate psychology students (13 women) were recruited via 
the same means as in Experiment 7. To avoid any effects of re-conditioning or 
desensitization to the procedure, none of the participants had been used in the 
previous experiment for this and all subsequent experiments. The participants had a 
mean age of 20.9 (+ 1.3) years. As before, participants provided written consent 
prior to participation.
5.3.1.2 Apparatus
Experiment 8 was conducted in the same room as the previous experiment, 
and employed the same equipment and software (see Chapter 2 for description). 
Additionally, this Experiment employed the same statements as Experiment 7 (See 
Appendix E for complete list). Exactly half the statements were true, and half false. 
The statements were randomized prior to each experiment session.
Given that reading would take time between when each statement was 
presented and when it would become apparently true or false, it was important to 
ensure that the response time to these statements was within the intended CS-UCS 
interval of the experiment. A preliminary study was conducted using four 
psychology students. The statements were randomized and sequentially presented on 
screen, and participants were instructed to respond to whether the statement was true 
or false via the same key-presses used in the previous experiment. Participant’s 
response times to these statements were measured. These measurements found that 
the time required to respond to the statements was well within the intended CS-UCS
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interval for the experiment (Mean = 1.53 ± .74 seconds). No statement required 
longer than 3 seconds to respond to by any participant.
5.3.1.3 Procedure
The participants were randomly divided into two groups of eight. In the first 
group, true statements served as the CS+, and in the second group false statements 
served as the CS+. Participants went through a similar setup processes as in the first 
experiment, except that this time they were instructed to simply “hold still and pay 
attention to the statements presented on the screen.”
Each participant received 40 trials, during a single 35 min experiment 
session. At the start of each trial, a statement was presented on the screen, and 
remained visible for 3 seconds. On CS+ trials, the UCS immediately followed the 
statement’s offset. On CS- trials, the UCS was not presented. As before, each trial 
was followed by a random inter-trial interval (ITI) of between 10 and 12 seconds 
before the next trial began.
5.3.1.4 Response measures and statistical analysis
Skin conductance responses for each trial were scored as the magnitude (in 
microSeimens) from trough to apex of the curve that began within a response 
window of 2 to 4 seconds following CS-onset (statement appearing on the monitor). 
SCR responses were blocked into blocks of 10 trials, as in the previous experiment. 
Statistical analysis was conducted on these blocks to test whether a significant 
change in SCR occurred over successive trial blocks between CS+ and CS- trials.
5.3.2 Results
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Figure 5-3: From Experiment 8, chart of averaged SCR’s in each trial- 
block for subjects reinforced following false statements (left) and true 
statements (right).
Figure 5-3 displays the mean SCR to CS+ and CS- trials in the false group 
(CS+ = false statements; left panel), and the true group (CS+ = true statements; right 
panel). As can be seen, little discrimination occurs in either group. For the false 
group (CS+ = false statements), however, a slight discriminative response appears to 
develop between the second and third trial blocks of conditioning. For the true group 
(CS+ = true statements) there appeared to be no significant discrimination, as both 
the response to true (CS+) and false (CS-) statements remain roughly stable over trial 
blocks. A mixed-model repeated-measures ANOVA (block x CS as within-subject 
factors, and group as a between-subject factor) revealed no statistically significant 
effects of Block (p > .8), CS (p > .13), Block x CS (p > .7), or Block x CS x Group 
(p> .7).
The graph of the data from Experiment 8 hints that false statements may have 
served as relatively stronger discriminative stimuli than true statements (some 
discrimination appears to be acquired in the last two trial blocks for the false group). 
To test this, separate repeated-measure ANOVA’s were run on each group. The test 
on the false group found no significant effects: (Block: p  > .9; CS: p  > .35; CS x 
Block: p  > .7). A test on the true group found a similar lack of significant results: 
(Block: p  > .14; CS: p  > .97; CS x Block: p  > .31).
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5.3.3 Discussion
The results of the current experiment show that the truth-value, whether true 
or false, of passively observed verbal statements, do not serve as a strong 
conditioned stimulus in an SCR procedure. This is the first known experiment 
attempting this with SCR, and is at odds with previous research attempting this with 
eyeblink responses (e.g. Fleming et al., 1968). This is also at odds with the findings 
of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter 4), which found at least a marginal conditioned 
eyeblink response to false statements. This does support the previously raised 
suspicion (section 4.5, Chapter 4) that the responses conditioned in Experiments 5 
and 6 were potentially operant avoidance responses, and the same could be argued 
for those in Experiment 4. The results of this experiment support that argument. As 
will be discussed in more detail below, one possible reason why this experiment 
failed to acquire significant conditioning with true and false statements might be that 
there are not sufficient contingencies in a person’s environment to shape a 
conditioned response to passively viewed statements. A person is not typically 
punished in the presence of false statements, as they are when they are deceptive.
This raises an important point, that the past conditioning of the individual is very 
important in the responses we are capable of conditioning in a single session. The 
previous conditioning history of the individual plays a great role. Whereas false 
statements have not likely received any classical conditioning, deceptive responses 
likely have, making the latter susceptible to new conditioning (periodic 
reconditioning), and the former not. This is a very important point, and will be 
returned to later.
5.4 General Discussion
The current studies investigated deception and truth-value as conditioned 
discriminative stimuli in an SCR procedure. Experiment 7 provided evidence that a 
participant’s deception can be conditioned as a discriminative stimulus, but that their 
truthful answers cannot. The results of this experiment also demonstrated the 
conditioning of an abstract property of a stimulus class, in this case the stimulus class 
being the participant’s verbal reports and the abstract property being the property of
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deception possessed by some of those reports. Similarly, these results demonstrate 
the classical conditioning of a behavior as a CS, an effect commonly talked about 
(e.g. Skinner, 1953; Skinner 1957), but lacking explicit experimental demonstration 
in the literature. The second experiment extended these results and the results of 
Chapter 4 by examining whether the observed truth-value of the same statements 
could alone serve as a discriminative stimulus. This experiment found that the truth- 
value (whether true, or false) of passively viewed statements does not serve as a 
strong discriminative stimulus. This established more firmly that the functional CS 
in the first experiment was the participants’ deception.
For convenience, the responses measured have hitherto been described in 
terms of acquisition of classically conditioned responses to the stimuli. There is a 
certain difficulty, however, in interpreting the responses to deception examined in 
Experiment 7 purely in terms of acquisition of a new response, as they have 
purportedly been pre-conditioned by past punishment to elicit physiological arousal. 
Under normal circumstances, this interference of pre-conditioning might be 
considered a liability to the validity of the conditioning acquired. In the current 
situation, however, there are two reasons why this may not be the case.
In the first place, as described earlier, comparison of the SCR's to deceptive 
responses in Experiment 7 when it served as CS+ (deceptive group) and CS- (truthful 
group) shows that pairing with the UCS had a significant effect of maintaining and 
increasing the SCR to deception (see Figure 5-2). This demonstrates that, even while 
deception has arousal associated with it to begin with, pairing with the UCS 
increased this arousal significantly. Likewise, when not paired with any aversive 
stimulus, the arousal exhibited following deception remained roughly unchanged and 
similar to the responses to truthful answers over trials.
In the second place, it could be argued that previous conditioning in 
participants’ histories provides the most parsimonious explanation for the difference 
in discrimination acquired between groups and between the experiments. O f the 
CS’s used in the four groups between the two experiments, deception is the only one 
that seems likely to have been punished in the typical history of an individual. Given 
that there is a connection between punishment and conditioned skin conductance 
responses (Waid, 1976; Skinner, 1953), the simplest explanation for why deceptive 
answers normally served as strong CS’s, while the other stimuli (truthful answers, 
true statements, and false statements) did not, seems to be that: firstly, the properties
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of all four of these stimuli make it difficult for them to serve as CS’s (verbal, 
complex, or simply inadequately conditioned2); secondly, the peculiar social 
significance of deception exposes it to consistent and generalized punishment from 
an early age (similar to swearing in Chapter 3), making it possible to bring an SCR 
under its control via discriminative training.
The results of the current studies support Skinner’s explanation for the 
responses measured by the polygraph. The study re-created Skinners postulation of 
how an emotional response could come under the control of deceptive behavior via 
pairings with punishment. As such, it demonstrated (perhaps for the first time) a 
direct relationship between the responses to deception and the past environmental 
events that cause them.
In this manner, Experiment 7 provides a more useful account of the origin of 
the responses measured by the polygraph than the ‘fear of detection’ theory. Such 
theories of lie detection could only propose indirect methods for the improving the 
accuracy of the polygraph, typically involving the manipulation of any possible 
aspect of the situation that might increase the similarity of the testing situation to past 
situations where deception had been paired with punishment (e.g., see “stimulation 
tests”; Reid & Inbau, 1966). The current studies, however, demonstrate that a CR to 
instances of deception can be manipulated in the absence of the factors that normally 
increase this “fear of detection.” It is the effect of past conditioning, not anticipation 
of future events, causing the response. Likewise, more accurate measurement of 
deception from physiological responses requires manipulation of conditioning, not 
anticipation.
By conditioning a response to deception in isolation from the other variables 
that tend to surround it, the present experiments demonstrate that the consistency and 
magnitude of the responses accompanying deception need not be dependent upon 
other factors. Rather, deception in the abstract can serve as a salient and distinct 
conditioned stimulus. As such, the current results suggest that by targeting deception 
in the abstract using a classical conditioning procedure, the CR to deception can be
2 As seen in the analysis o f verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), bringing a verbal response under the 
control o f an appropriate verbal stimulus (e.g. the response “true” to the stimulus “you are sitting in a 
chair”) requires a great deal o f discriminative reinforcement. Bringing a classically conditioned 
response under the control o f similar verbal stimuli would presumably require similarly extensive 
conditioning, and this occurring would be rare for the vast majority o f  verbal stimuli, given that there 
is no practical benefit to the verbal community for doing so.
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brought more precisely under the control of deception, possibly freeing it from 
extraneous factors affecting the accuracy and reliability of traditional polygraph 
tests. The process can be seen as a form of discrimination training, in which all 
properties of the situations typically surrounding deception are trimmed away- 
leaving only the property of deceptiveness in control of the conditioned response.
Given the claim that this method could form the basis for a more direct 
measurement of deception, it should be noted that the discrimination between 
truthful and deceptive answers acquired in Experiment 7 was probably far below 
what would be ideal for this purpose. It is worth noting at this point, however, that in 
controlled laboratory experiments, without the use of a “mock-crime” scenario, or 
other means of artificially increasing the similarity to “real-life” instances of 
deception, the polygraph itself gets little better than chance results (Reid & Inbau, 
1966). While the present experiments sought only to demonstrate that such 
conditioning was possible, it will be the task of continued research to discover 
modifications of the methods used here to bring this discrimination to a practical 
level. Manipulation of the number of conditioning trials, truthful/deceptive trials 
ratio, CS-UCS ratio, and perhaps even number of conditioning sessions will 
hopefully find more distinct control of the deception over the CR. Further research 
must also test generalization of the CR to more realistic instances of deception (e.g. 
regarding real-world events and information of a more hidden nature).
In conclusion, the present chapter used statements that relied upon external 
conditioning to be true or false (e.g. “The world is flat”), and then tested whether the 
truth value of these statements in itself could serve as a conditioned stimulus. 
Alternatively, the next chapter used a similar conditioning procedure, but with 
instances of deception where the context that made the statement true or false was 
controlled in the laboratory. This allowed a minimum amount of personal 
involvement, and increased control in isolating the deceptive response as the 
conditioned stimulus.
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Chapter 6
Using Classical Conditioning to Amplify Skin 
Conductance Responses to Deception in a 
Cluedo-Type Scenario
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6.1 General Introduction
The results of Experiment 7 (Chapter 5) suggested that deception can serve as 
a conditioned stimulus in a skin conductance conditioned paradigm. The deception 
in Chapter 5 was regarding the truth-value of simple statements presented on the 
screen. Subject’s knowing the truth-value of these statements relied upon their past 
conditioning. The present experiment further examined deception as a conditioned 
stimulus by developing an ecologically valid context for deception to be elicited in.
There has been a great deal of interest in developing new methods of lie 
detection (e.g., Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, Castiello, 2008; Tsiamyrtzis, 
Dowdall, Shastri, Pavlidis, Frank, Ekman, 2007; Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton,
Adams, Wei, Peijia, 2005). While valuable, most of these methods have rested upon 
assumptions about the same deception-arousal relationship relied upon by the 
polygraph, and, hence, they are vulnerable to the same problems that have limited the 
utility of the polygraph. They do not aim to understand the relation between 
deception and physiological arousal, or its origin. If this relation is imperfect, so are 
these methods.
As previously argued (see section 1.2, Chapter 1), improving the utility of 
this relationship may require an examination of how it is originally formed. Skinner 
(1953) presented a simple explanation of how deception comes to elicit physiological 
responses. According to Skinner, the polygraph measures, not deception per se, but 
“\the\ emotional responses generated when the individual engages in behavior for  
which he has previously been punished’ (Skinner, 1953, p. 187). According to this 
theory, the responses exhibited are a side effect of the punishment individuals often 
receive in everyday life when their deception is detected. For example, as was seen 
in Chapter 3, people exhibit higher physiological arousal when saying swear words 
than non-offensive control words (Experiment 2, Chapter 3), and those who are 
punished more for swearing exhibit stronger SCR’s when swearing (Experiment 3, 
Chapter 3). The main difference between swear words and less offensive words is 
that the former are likely to have been punished by parents and other authority 
figures in a person’s environment (Jay et al., 2006). Experiment 7 (Chapter 5) 
demonstrated that deception can serve as a conditioned stimulus- supporting the 
assertion that previous punishment is what leads to the increased skin conductance 
when deceptive.
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, there has been some related work to this theory, 
but not much. For example, Jaffee, Millman, and Gorman (1966) classically 
conditioned an eyeblink response to instances of verbal deception by pairing 
instances of deception with a comeal airpuff. Their results supported the notion that 
deception can serve as a conditioned stimulus, but there have been, to our 
knowledge, no known attempts to expand upon this research in the last 40 years. 
Chapter 4 of the present thesis followed up on this research by exploring whether the 
truth-value of statements can serve as a conditioned stimulus in an eyeblink 
conditioning paradigm. Chapter 5 then tested the conditioning of a skin conductance 
response to instances of deception regarding statements with obvious truth-value 
(e.g. “grass is blue”) (section 5.2.1.2, Chapter 5).
The use of true and false statements, however, potentially presented a 
confound- as false statements are in themselves novel stimuli. The present chapter 
followed up on this research by exploring the conditioning of a skin conductance 
response to instances of deception that were made true or false given the context of 
the experiment, rather than externally. An internally consistent context was 
developed in which participant’s could answer questions both truthfully and 
deceptively, while at the same time minimizing the influence of personally relevant 
variables that would normally increase SCR. It was expected that deception within 
this contextually controlled setting could come to serve as a conditioned stimulus, 
expanding upon the results of previous chapters.
6.2 Experiment 9
To create an internally consistent context in which subjects could be 
deceptive with minimal personal involvement, this experiment used a paradigm 
similar to the game Cluedo™ (Clue™ in the U.S.) In this variation, subjects had to 
deceive the computer regarding the identity of a murderer in a series of questions. 
Over the course of these trials, deceptive answers were paired with mild electric 
shocks according to the group that each subject was in (see below). Previous 
chapters had difficulty establishing an effect of conditioning due to a pre-existing 
tendency for subjects to exhibit skin conductance following deceptive answers (see 
Experiment 7, Chapter 5). This experiment, therefore, included a control group for 
comparison. Rather than deliver no shock in the control group, which would leave
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open the possibility the experimental group was exhibiting sensitization because they 
were receiving shocks when the control group was not, the control group received 
very mild shocks. As previous experiments (e.g. Experiment 6, Chapter 4) had 
found an effect of ratio UCS presentation, the present chapter tested whether ratio 
UCS presentation influenced the results acquired.
6.2.1 Method
6.2.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight Swansea University Psychology students (27 female) participated 
in exchange for course credits. The participants had a mean age of 22.8 (± 2.9 SD) 
years. As in previous experiments, participants were recruited through the 
Psychology Department’s online subject pool. All participants provided informed 
written consent prior to participating.
6.2.1.2 Apparatus
Participant’s SCR was measured using the ADInstruments® PowerLab 2/25 
data acquisition system (ML825), which sampled continuously at lk/sec. Finger 
Electrodes were attached to the palmer surface of the first and third fingers of the 
participant’s non-dominant hand. The SCR for each trial were scored as the 
magnitude (in microSiemens) from trough to peak of the first response occurring 
with an onset latency of 1-4 s after the participant’s keyboard response. These 
responses were normalized within each subject prior to analysis by dividing the SCR 
on each trial by the maximum SCR exhibited by that subject during the session.
The UCS was a mild electrical shock presented from ADInstruments® 
Stimulus Isolator (ML 180), and delivered via electrodes attached to the participant’s 
inner lower dominant arm. The shock intensity was individually adjusted for each 
participant using a shock workup procedure- by starting at a setting so low they 
could not feel it, and increasing it slightly in steps until the subject rated it as 
“uncomfortable, but not painful” (see section 5.2.1.2, Chapter 5, for further detail).
In the low-shock condition, the final intensity was then reduced by half- resulting in 
a shock that the subject could barely feel.
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6.2.1.3 Procedure
To provide a context in which participants could answer questions 
deceptively and truthfully with consistency and minimal personal involvement, a 
scenario similar to the game Clue™ was used. After the electrodes were attached, 
the participant was given instructions. They were told that they would take part in a 
game similar to the game Clue, in which they would be presented with a murder and 
a murder weapon at the beginning of each set of trials, and that they would need to 
memorize these. They were told that they would then be asked a series of questions 
regarding this murderer and murder weapon, for example “was this the murderer”- 
[showing a card with a suspect on it], or “was this the murder weapon” [showing a 
card with a weapon on it]. Subjects were told that they could answer these questions 
using the keyboard, pressing “z” for no, and “m” for yes. Additionally, participants 
were told to “try to deceive the program regarding the identity of the murderer,” and 
that this would involve not only answering “no” when asked whether the murderer 
was the murderer, but also “framing” one of the innocent suspects by saying that 
they were the murderer. They did not need to always claim the murderer was the 
same person, and it was up to them to choose which person to claim the murderer 
was.
At the beginning of each set of six trials, the computer presented two 
randomly selected cards on the screen: the murderer and the murder weapon (Figure 
6-1), which participants were asked to memorize (see Appendix G for complete 
listing of suspect cards and Appendix H for a listing of murder weapon cards used).
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Figure 6-1: Screen shot of Clue task used in experiments, showing the 
screen in which the m urderer and m urder weapon were presented at the 
beginning of each set of trials.
Following this, participants were presented with a series o f six trials in which 
the program presented a randomly selected suspect or weapon card, and asked 
whether this was the murderer or the murder weapon, respectively. At the beginning 
of each trial, the program paused 5 seconds to provide baseline. The card and 
question were then presented on the computer monitor (Figure 6-2). Once the 
participant answered using keystrokes, the program determined whether their answer 
was truthful or deceptive. On reinforced trials, the shock followed 3 seconds after 
deceptive answers. If the answer was deceptive, an electric shock was delivered- 
depending on the group (see below). No electric shocks were delivered on truthful 
trials.
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Figure 6-2: Screen shot of Clue task used in experiments, showing the 
screen in which participants answered w hether the presented card was 
the m urderer or m urder weapon.
For each set o f 6 trials, the subject answered deceptively twice: once to say 
that the murderer was not the murderer, and once to say that an innocent subject was 
the murderer. Following the set o f six trials, the program presented a feedback 
screen telling the participant whether they had “successfully deceived the program,” 
i.e. whether they had answered truthfully regarding the murder weapons, and lied 
twice regarding the identity o f the murderer.
For conditioning, participants were divided into 4 groups, based on two 
variables: shock intensity and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) ratio. The shock 
intensity was varied between participants, with half receiving the full electric shock 
[high-shock group] and half receiving a much milder shock [low-shock group] (see 
procedure). The UCS ratio was varied so that half the participants received the 
shock following every deceptive answer [non-ratio group], and half received the 
shock following 60% [ratio-group] o f their deceptive answers.
To only include the fully learned responses, we used only the last half (30 
trials) o f  the trials from each subject in the analysis. For statistical analysis, the SCR 
on deceptive and truthful trials for each subject were averaged to produce a final 
subject mean for deceptive and truthful trials.
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6.2.2 Results
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  M e a n  S C R ' s  A c r o s s  G r o u p s  f o r  D e c e p t i v e  a n d  T r u t h f u l  A n s w e r s
■  deceptive (CS+) 
□  truthful (CS-)
High Shock Low Shock High Shock Low Shock
Non-Ratio Group Ratio Group
Figure 6-3: Mean SCR across subjects for Deceptive and Truthful trials 
in ratio, non-ratio, high-shock and low-shock conditions. E rror bars 
show standard error.
Figure 6-3 displays the group mean SCR to both deceptive and truthful 
answers over the last 30 trials (high shock vs. low shock; ratio vs. non-ratio). Within 
all groups there was a difference between the SCR to deceptive and truthful answers, 
but this difference was greater in the high-shock conditions. There was an apparent 
difference between ratio and non-ratio groups, but to a far lesser extent than that seen 
for shock intensity.
A mixed-model analysis of variance with 2 between subject factors (UCS 
Ratio: 100%, 60%; Shock Intensity: High-Shock, Low-Shock), and one within- 
subjects factor (CS: Deceptive, Truthful) was conducted, and a significance level of 
.05 was adopted. This test found a significant main effect of CS: F ( l, 86) = 5.61 ,/? = 
.02, indicating a discriminated responding between deceptive (CS+) and truthful 
(CS-) answers across all groups. There was also a significant interaction between CS 
and shock intensity: F (l, 86) = 4.49,/? < .04, indicating that in the high-shock
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condition the difference between deceptive and truthful responses was significantly 
different than that between the low-shock condition. Ratio vs. Non-ratio did not 
have a significant effect, and there were no other significant effects to report (p >
.30).
6.2.3 Discussion
The present experiment found a significantly higher SCR to deception than to 
truthful answers across all groups, which is to be expected. When paired with a 
salient UCS, however, deception acquired a stronger discriminative SCR than when 
paired with a barely perceptible shock. This suggests that the conditioning procedure 
had an effect on the SCR to deception. Given that deception was the only stimulus 
that predicted the presentation of the shock, this shows that it was the abstract 
deception that was serving as the CS.
Based on observation of the data, ratio UCS presentation seemed to have 
some effect on the SCR differentiation acquired, but the statistics did not find a 
significant difference. As can be seen in Figure 6-3, the main effect of ratio UCS 
presentation was on the SCR’s exhibited following truthful answers, rather than on 
deceptive answers. Whereas the deceptive responses stayed roughly the same 
between ratio and non-ratio subjects, the responses on truthful answers were slightly 
lower for ratio subjects, suggesting perhaps that the presentation of fewer shocks 
over the course of the experiment led to less generalization to truthful answers. This 
effect was not strong, however, and did not reach statistical significance.
By demonstrating the conditioning of an SCR to deception, these results 
expand upon the results from Experiment 7 (Chapter 5), and are consistent with 
Skinner’s (1953) explanation for the origin of the physiological responses that 
accompany deception. As such, these results show overlap between two very 
different research fields (lie detection and classical conditioning). This new direction 
in understanding the responses a person exhibits during tests like the polygraph could 
have significant consequences for the development of these fields. This implies that 
the responses relied upon by the polygraph can be manipulated and strengthened in a 
more direct manner than has been previously possible. Reliance upon the 
physiological arousal that a person already exhibits when deceptive has provided 
some positive results for previous lie detection, but has also proven perilously
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inconsistent and situation-contingent (e.g., see National Research Council, 2003). 
Even attempts to replicate polygraph results in the laboratory have proven difficult, 
undermining its scientific basis. By pointing out the way in which these responses 
originate, however, we can not only re-create the responses in the laboratory, but also 
potentially manipulate and improve them in practical use. While it may be that 
applying procedures like those above prior to a polygraph test could significantly 
improve the accuracy of the test, further research is needed to test generalization of 
these results to “real world” deception. The second experiment in this chapter 
examined generalization of this conditioned response to questions where the subject 
knew the experimenter and computer were ignorant of the correct answer.
6.3 Experiment 10
The results from Experiment 9 indicate that classical conditioning in a 
Cluedo-type scenario can be used to improve the SCR discrimination that subject’s 
exhibit to deceptive answers. While this is valuable, for such discrimination to be 
applicable to lie detection in the field, it needs to be known whether this 
discrimination will last when subjects are deceptive regarding questions where they 
know the experimenter and computer do not know when they are being deceptive. 
That is, would the effects of such conditioning generalize to situations where the 
subject is deceptive on truly private matters? Stimulus generalization is the tendency 
of responses conditioned to one stimulus to be elicited by other stimuli that share 
similar properties to the initial stimulus (Skinner, 1938;Pavlov, 1927). The second 
experiment in this chapter, therefore, focused on exploring whether this conditioning 
would generalize to questions where only the subject knew the correct response. The 
deception was similar in all its properties, except that only the subjects knew the true 
answer. It was anticipated that the conditioned responses to deception regarding 
known murderers exhibited would at least partially generalize to instances of 
deception regarding unknown murderers.
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6.3.1 Method
6.3.1.1 Participants
Fourteen Swansea University Psychology students (8 female) participated in 
exchange for course credits. Subjects had a mean age of 23 (± 4.3) years. As in 
previous experiments, participants gave informed consent prior to participating.
6.3.1.2 Apparatus
The same equipment was used in this experiment as in the previous for 
measuring subjects SCR and delivering stimuli. SCR’s were scored in the same 
manner as before.
As before, for statistical analysis, the SCR on deceptive and truthful trials for 
each subject were averaged over each block of 6 trials (conditioning sets) and 5 trials 
(generalization sets) to produce a final subject mean for deceptive and truthful trials.
6.3.1.3 Procedure
Participants were divided into 2 groups (control, which did not receive 
shocks, and experimental, which received shocks). To allow comparison with 
previous experiments, it was decided to deliver no shocks in the control group, rather 
than mild shocks as had been done in the previous experiment.
This experiment employed exactly the same procedure as the last, except that 
generalization trials, in which the subject was asked questions regarding a murderer 
that only they knew, were added. To accomplish this, prior to each experiment the 
subject was presented with 5 envelopes containing different mock suspects. These 
suspects had fictional names, demographics, crimes, and an image taken from minor 
offense wanted lists in the United States (see Appendix I for all images used). Figure 
6-4 presents an example suspect file.
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SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT SUSPECT 
INFORMATION SHIFT
NAME: EDWARD JONES 
FILE NUMBER: 6 1 0 2 4 S 3 2
DATE OF BIRTH: 3 0 /0 9 /1 9 6 7  
AGE 4 3  
RACE: WHITE 
HEIGHT 6 '1 "
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
SEX MALE
WEIGHT 197 
EYE COLOR: BROWN
OFFENSES BANK ROBBERY
Figure 6-4: Scanned copy of a suspect file from Experim ent 10.
The participants were asked to randomly select one o f the five possible 
envelopes, memorize the information on the file contained within it, and put the file 
back in the envelope without telling the experimenter which suspect they had drawn. 
Following this, they were taken to the laboratory and instructed as in the previous 
experiment regarding how to complete the conditioning trials. In this experiment 
however, suspects were given additional instructions for the generalization trials they
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would receive. Subjects were told “you would periodically be presented with 
questions regarding the suspect you have just read about on the file. The computer 
will present a series of possible suspects and ask if each was the person you drew. 
You should try to deceive the computer on these trials in exactly the same way you 
do with the murderer in the Cluedo game, lying and saying that one of the other 
suspects is the one you drew.” To assure subjects that they were being deceptive 
regarding information that only they knew, they were further instructed “neither the 
computer nor the experimenter knows which suspect you have drawn.”
The trials were run as in the previous experiment: at the beginning of each set 
of six conditioning trials, the computer presented two randomly selected cards on the 
screen: the murderer and the murder weapon, which participants were asked to 
memorize (Figure 6-1). They would then go through six trials being asked about the 
murderer and weapon, trying to deceive the computer regarding the murderer’s 
identity. As in Experiment 9, at the beginning of each trial, the program paused 5 
seconds to provide baseline. Following this the card and question were presented on 
the computer monitor (Figure 6-2). Once the participant answered using keystrokes, 
the program determined whether their answer was truthful or deceptive. On 
reinforced trials, the shock followed 3 seconds after deceptive answers. If the 
answer was deceptive, an electric shock was delivered- depending on the group (see 
below). No electric shocks were delivered on truthful trials.
For each set of generalization trials, the computer would go through 5 
generalization trials- sequentially presenting the possible suspects from the 
envelopes in random order, and asking on each if the suspect was that which the 
participant had seen from the envelope (Figure 6-5). These trials were the same as 
the conditioning trials. One of five possible suspects was presented on the screen, 
and the subject was asked if this was the suspect they had drawn. As on conditioning 
trials, subjects answered via keystrokes. Following this answer, the suspect was 
removed and there was a randomized inter-trial interval of 9 to 11 seconds before the 
next suspect was presented. No shocks were delivered on die generalization trials.
Was this the Suspect?
Press "Z" for No Press "M" for Yes
Figure 6-5: From Experim ent 10, screen shot of Clue generalization 
trial, showing the screen in which participants answered w hether the 
presented suspect was the one they had previously draw n.
Each participant received a total o f 97 trials, 25 o f which were generalization 
trials (four rounds o f 24 conditioning trials followed by 5 generalization trials). Prior 
to any conditioning, they received a set o f 5 generalization trials for an initial 
baseline measurement. Following the experiment, the participant was asked which 
suspect they had drawn prior to the experiment, so that their deceptive answers could 
be identified for analysis.
6.3.1.4 Analysis
For analysis, trials were divided into 3 types: Those on which the subject had 
told the truth (truthful trials), those on which the subject had deceptively claimed that 
the suspect was innocent (negative deception); and those on which the subject 
claimed an innocent suspect was the murderer (positive deception). Subject’s SCRs 
on these types o f trial were then compared for each group.
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6.3.2 Results
Comparison of control and experimental groups on 
conditioning trials
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Figure 6-6: Comparison of conditioning trials over course of training for
control subjects (left) and experimental subjects (right).
The results from the conditioning trials support the results of Experiment 9. 
Figure 6-6 displays the group mean SCR to positive deceptive answers (when 
participants deceptively claimed an innocent suspect was the murderer), negative 
deceptive answers (when they deceptively claimed the murderer was innocent), and 
truthful answers for every set of 24 training trials (4 blocks) over the course of the 
experiment. As can be seen in the figure, participants in the control group did not 
exhibit much discrimination between deceptive and truthful answers, whereas 
participants that received conditioning appear to acquire strong discrimination to 
both types of deception on conditioning trials over the course of the experiment.
A mixed-model analysis of variance with one between subject factor (Control 
vs. Experimental group), and two within-subject factors (CS: Positive Deceptive vs. 
Negative Deception vs. Truthful, and Block) was conducted, and a significance level 
of .05 was adopted. This test found a significant main effect of Answer-type: F(2, 
24) = 14.22,/? < .001, indicating a discriminated responding between the two types 
of deceptive answers and truthful answers across all groups. There was also a
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significant interaction between Answer-Type and Group: F(2, 24) = 4.92, p  < .02, 
indicating that in the group where shocks were delivered the difference between 
deceptive and truthful responses was significantly different than that between the 
control condition. A significant interaction was also found between Block and 
Group: F{3, 36) = 4.7,/? < .01, indicating more change in responding in the 
experimental than the control condition. There was no significant interaction 
between Block, Answer-Type, and Group (p > .097).
Figure 6-7 displays the group mean SCR to positive deceptive answers, 
negative deceptive answers, and truthful answers for the last 3 blocks of 
generalization trials (because there was only one of each type of deceptive answer 
per trial block, the last 3 blocks were averaged to reduce noise). As can be seen in 
the figure, participants in the control group seem to have lower SCR’s to truthful and 
deceptive answers, whereas participants that received conditioning came to exhibit 
stronger discrimination over the course of the experiment.
□
Comparison of averaged generalization SCR's 
between control and experimental groups
40
□
35
Control Experimental
Group
Figure 6-7: Comparison of averaged SCR’s on last 3 blocks (15 trials) of 
generalization trials between control (left) and experimental (right) 
subjects.
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A repeated-measures analysis of variance was conducted on the averaged 
results from the last 3 blocks for each subject, with Trial-type as a within-subject 
factor (Positive Deception vs. Negative Deception vs. Truthful) and Group as a 
between-subjects factor (Experimental vs. Control). This test found a significant 
interaction between Trial-type and Group (F(2, 24) = 4.31 ,P <  .03), indicating that in 
the experimental group subjects exhibited significantly different responses to the 
types of trials. There was not a significant effect of Trial-type alone (p > .25).
As trial-type yielded a significant effect, further analyses were conducted to 
compare the specific trial types. A series of protected one-way t-tests was performed 
comparing each trial type in the experimental group to the others. These tests found 
a significant difference in SCR between positive deception trials and truthful trials: 
t(6) = 3.56,/? < .006, but not between negative deception trials and truthful trials (p > 
.07). There was also not a significant difference between positive and negative 
deception trials (p > .2).
6.3.3 Discussion
The results from this experiment show a strong SCR was conditioned to 
deceptive trials in the conditioning trials for the experimental group, and not for the 
control group. This is consistent with the findings of Experiment 9. In the 
generalization trials, however, only the trials involving positive deception (where the 
subject falsely claimed an innocent suspect was guilty) elicited strong responses. 
While the negative deception trials almost approached significance, they were not 
statistically different from truthful trials. This is an interesting effect, suggesting that 
something about deceptively claiming a suspect is guilty is a more salient stimulus 
for generalization than deceptively claiming the murderer is innocent. It could 
perhaps be that the behaviors involved in deciding whether to “frame” the innocent 
suspect were partially serving as the conditioned stimulus on these trials, whereas 
they were absent on the negative deception trials.
6.4 General Discussion
It has been known for some time that physiological arousal (including SCR) 
can be classically conditioned (Dawson & Furedy, 1976). Likewise it is known that
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deception, in some situations, elicits a strong physiological response, and that 
deception tends to be wrapped up in situations where punishment is likely. Despite 
the elegance of combining these facts into an explanation for the physiological 
responses a person exhibits during the polygraph, this theory has gone without 
empirical testing. This study presents direct evidence that deception in the abstract 
can be classically conditioned to elicit a strong SCR.
The present chapter presented two experiments exploring deception regarding 
murderers in a Cluedo-like simulation as conditioned stimuli. Experiment 9 found 
that a significantly higher SCR can be conditioned by pairing instances of deception 
in such a context with a mild electric shock. Ratio presentation of the UCS was not 
found to have an effect, however. This is an important finding, as it develops further 
the findings of Experiment 7 (Chapter 5), providing further evidence that deception 
can serve as a conditioned stimulus even when it is regarding topics of a relatively 
arbitrary and non-personal nature. The second experiment tested whether these 
conditioned responses would generalize across the “privacy barrier,” or to instances 
of deception where only the subject knew if they were being deceptive. The findings 
suggest that, even with relatively few conditioning trials, generalization does occur. 
Strangely, however, this generalization was only significant for instances of positive 
deception- in which the subject deceptively claimed that an innocent suspect was the 
murderer. This is significant, as the core problem of lie detection is arguably the 
capacity of the test to breach this barrier between what can be known objectively 
through other means, and what is only known by the person being tested. If it is 
found that a subject will not exhibit the same responses when they “know” that only 
they have accurate information regarding what they are being deceptive about, then 
lie detection will fail in any practical sense. Luckily, the present experiment found 
some evidence that this barrier can be breached. Further investigation, however, is 
required to improve the accuracy of the results to a more practical level.
Most of the recent research on lie detection has focused on finding new ways 
to measure the physiological arousal that accompanies deception. As such, the 
assumptions of the polygraph are usually implicitly accepted uncritically. The 
studies presented here take a step towards understanding the cause of this relation 
between deception and physiological arousal. Conditioning can both explain the 
origin of a physiological response to deception and how this response can generalize 
to new situations and instances of deception never directly paired with punishment.
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This is an important point, as no two instances of deception are the same, nor are the 
situations in which they occur.
Similar processes of conditioning can be used to manipulate this relation, 
increasing a subject’s SCR when they are deceptive. The results of the present 
experiments both support this notion and point to a potential practical method of 
improving lie detection results.
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7.1 Overview
Improvement of the polygraph at this point relies upon a better understanding 
of the responses that it, and other methods of lie detection, have relied upon for its 
results. As seen in Chapter 1, however, little effort and research has gone into 
understanding the physiological arousal that tends to accompany deception. Among 
the theories that have been put forth is that these responses are conditioned by 
instances in a person’s life when deception is paired with punishment and aversive 
consequences. This theory would have us understand deception as a conditioned 
stimulus for the responses that accompany it. This could have great implications for 
lie detection and its improvement. The current thesis examined the effect of 
conditioning and punishment on the physiological responses a person exhibits when 
they are deceptive.
Ten experiments examined the direct conditioning of different responses to 
deception and the components of deception. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (see Chapter 3) 
looked at the effect of the past punishment in a person’s conditioning history on the 
physiological arousal they exhibit to instances of swearing in a laboratory setting.
One of the core premises of the current thesis is that punishment in a person’s 
previous experience for certain types of verbal behavior (e.g. deception) will cause 
increased physiological arousal when they engage in those behaviors.
The first three experiments were designed to examine the link between a 
person’s past behavior with punishment for a type of behavior (swearing was 
convenient -  as it is a type of verbal behavior that is commonly punished) and their 
physiological arousal when engaging in it now. The goal of Experiment 1 (Chapter
3) was to test whether subjects found swear words more offensive than similar 
matched and emotional words. To this end, subjects’ rating of offensiveness and 
emotionality was taken using a Likert scale for a list of swear words, and compared 
to a similar list of emotional words and matched word. It was anticipated that 
subject’s who scored higher on questionnaires measuring their previous punishment 
for swearing and lower on swearing frequency would rate swear words as more 
offensive than other word-types. Experiments 2 and 3 (see Chapter 3) used the same 
words from Experiment 1 (see Chapter 3), and examined whether subjects had higher 
skin conductance responses when reading aloud the swear words than the other word 
types (matched and emotional). It was expected that swear words would elicit
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stronger physiological responses (skin conductance) than the matched words 
(Experiment 2), and that this difference would be higher for participants that scored 
high on the previous punishment questionnaire and low on the swearing frequency 
questionnaire (Experiment 3). The goal of these experiments was to establish 
whether punishment in a person’s past social conditioning can leave physiological 
responses to the behaviors punished, as is thought to happen with deception.
Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter 4) investigated the classical conditioning of 
an eyeblink response to the truth-value of statements presented on a computer screen. 
An eyeblink response was chosen because it can be readily conditioned in a 
controlled setting (Woodruff-Pak & Steinmetz, 2010) and because it is not normally 
associated with the polygraph, making it an initially neutral response. Truth-value is 
an important stimulus, as no response is deceptive outside of the context in which it 
is uttered, and the truth-value of the statement being uttered is a primary factor in 
determining whether the response is deceptive. It is therefore important to know if 
truth-value itself can become a conditioned stimulus if paired with an unconditioned 
stimulus (comeal airpuff in this case). These experiments employed a list of 
statements, half true (e.g. “Humans need air”) and half false (e.g. “Humans are 
reptiles”), which were presented on the screen one at a time. Experiment 4 attempted 
to classically condition an eyeblink response to the property of falseness in the list of 
statements. To this end, each false statement presented on the screen was paired with 
a comeal airpuff 1000 ms (1 sec.) following the presentation of the statement, 
whereas tme statements were not paired with an airpuff. It was expected that over 
the course of 100 conditioning trials a discriminatory eyeblink response to false 
statements would develop. Experiment 5 attempted the same feat, but using an inter­
stimulus interval of 2000 ms, rather than 1000 ms. Experiment 6 was the same as 
Experiment 5, but attempted to classically condition an eyeblink response to tme as 
well as false statements, and also tested the effect of a ratio schedule of UCS 
presentation on the conditioning of the response.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, Experiments 7 and 8 (Chapter 5) 
returned to the use of skin conductance as target response. These experiments 
employed a list of statements similar to that used in experiments 4, 5, and 6. As 
before, half the statements were tme (e.g. “Pigeons are birds”) and half were false 
(e.g. “Rocks are alive”). In Experiment 7, subjects were asked to respond via 
keystroke to whether each statement presented was tme or false (‘z’ for false, ‘c’ for
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true). Additionally, they were asked to answer deceptively if the statement referred 
to “them personally or the room they are in.” In this way, subjects were made to 
answer deceptively on roughly half the presented statements. Half the subjects were 
given a mild electric shock following each deceptive answer in this experiment, and 
half were given an electric shock following every truthful response- for comparison. 
It was anticipated that those shocked following deceptive answers would develop a 
conditioned SCR to their own deceptive responses over the course of conditioning 
trials. It was also expected that subjects shocked following truthful responses would 
develop a conditioned response to truthful responses, but perhaps to a lesser extent. 
Experiment 8 returned to the question addressed by Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter
4), and examined the conditioning of a skin conductance response to the truth-value 
of the observed statements. For half the subjects, false statements served as the 
conditioned stimulus, and for the other half true statements served as the conditioned 
stimulus. It was anticipated that both true and false statements could be conditioned 
to elicit a skin conductance response over the course of training trials, perhaps with 
false statements serving as a stronger CS than true statements.
Experiments 9 and 10 (Chapter 6) examined the conditioning of a skin 
conductance response to deceptive responses in a more internally consistent 
deception scenario. A computer program was employed that engaged subjects in a 
Cluedo-like game where they had to deceive the computer regarding the identity of a 
murderer over the course of numerous trials. This required subjects to answer some 
questions deceptively and some truthfully. Experiment 9 employed this game to 
attempt to condition a skin conductance response to subjects’ deceptive responses on 
this game. Subjects were divided into four groups to test the effect of two important 
variables on the conditioning: ratio vs. continuous UCS presentation and normal vs. 
low shock intensity. It was expected that subjects who received normal shock 
intensity would develop a strong conditioned response to their deceptive answers, 
whereas those with low shock intensity would not. It was further anticipated that 
ratio shock delivery would lead to a more robust and consistent conditioned 
response. Experiment 10 followed up on Experiment 9 by addressing the important 
question of whether the conditioned responses created or enhanced in this sort of a 
procedure would generalize to instances of deception where the experimenter did not 
know whether the subject was being deceptive. To this end, prior to the experiment 
subjects randomly drew a murder suspect from a folder, read it, and replaced it
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without the experimenter or computer knowing whom it was (there were 5 possible 
suspects). Throughout the conditioning procedure (which was the same as 
Experiment 9), the program would periodically question the subject regarding the 
identity of this murderer, and they were told to deceive the program regarding their 
identity. It was anticipated that, as their conditioned response to instances of 
deception where the computer knew they were deceptive increased, they would 
exhibit stronger responses as well when deceptive on these generalization questions. 
The results from these experiments are discussed, as well as the practical and 
theoretical implications of their findings.
7.2 Summary of Results
7.2.1 Chapter 3 Summary
Experiment 1 tested whether subjects with higher previous punishment for 
swearing in their normal environment would rate swear words as more offensive than 
emotional and frequency and length matched control words. It found (not 
surprisingly) that swear words were scored as significantly more offensive than 
emotional or matched words. Emotional words, additionally, were scored as 
significantly more emotional than offensive or matched words. Questionnaire results 
for previous punishment for swearing, however, narrowly missed significantly 
impacting the offensiveness with which subjects rated swear words, making a 
connection between previous punishment for swearing and offensiveness ratings of 
swear words elusive. Swearing frequency, likewise, did not have an impact on 
offensiveness ratings.
Experiment 2 compared the arousal exhibited when speaking swear words to 
that exhibited when speaking emotional and control words. Results found that 
subjects had a significantly stronger skin conductance following swear words than 
both emotional and matched words. This supports previous findings that being 
shown taboo words elicits stronger arousal than control words (Dinn & Harris, 2000; 
Gray, Hughes, & Schneider, 1982), and expands upon it by showing the effect with 
speaking the words aloud. Given that a person is more likely to have been socially 
punished following swearing than simply seeing swear words printed, this is an 
important finding. Further research comparing the arousal exhibited when swearing 
to that exhibited when simply seeing swear words would be very interesting, as it
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would likely reflect this difference in punishment probabilities. Additionally, as 
would be expected from previous literature (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989) emotional 
words had significantly strong skin conductance responses than did matched words.
Experiment 3 used the same data from the previous experiments, and 
analyzed subject’s skin conductance responses to swear words based on their scores 
on the punishment and frequency questionnaires discussed earlier. It found that past 
punishment caused a significantly higher skin conductance response following swear 
words, as had been predicted. This is the first known demonstration of this, making 
it an interesting addition to the literature regarding swearing and skin conductance 
(Harris et al., 2003). Swearing frequency, however, did not have a significant effect 
on skin conductance following swear words.
The results from this chapter suggest that engaging in a particular verbal 
behavior that is likely to have been punished in one’s conditioning history (e.g. 
swearing) elicit stronger physiological arousal than engaging in similar behaviors 
that are not likely to have been punished (e.g. saying control words). Additionally, 
those who have been more punished for this undesirable behavior are likely to 
exhibit even stronger physiological arousal than those who have been less punished. 
These results support the notion that punishment in a person’s past social 
conditioning will lead to increased physiological arousal when engaging in the 
behaviors that have been punished. Given that deception is another behavior likely 
to be punished in a person’s normal conditioning history, it is sensible to suspect that 
the observed physiological arousal they exhibit when deceptive is related to this 
punishment. The results of this chapter draw an important link between the 
conditioning that people in our society receive, and the physiological arousal 
measured by the polygraph.
7.2.2 Chapter 4 Summary
Experiment 4 employed an eyeblink conditioning paradigm to test whether 
the truth-value of statements could serve as a conditioned stimulus. The results 
corroborated previous findings that it is possible to condition an eyeblink response to 
the truth-value of statements (e.g., El'kin, 1957; Fleming, Grant, & North, 1968). 
Over the course of training trials, subjects acquired a stronger eyeblink to false (CS+) 
than true (CS-) statements. The effect, however, did not seem to be as strong as that
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reported in the previous studies on this topic (e.g. Fleming, Grant, & North, 1968). 
One reason for this, it was surmised, might be that the previous studies used a longer 
time period between the statement presentation and the presentation of the airpuff 
(1900 ms rather than 1000 ms)- perhaps giving subjects more time to read the 
statement. Experiment 5 attempted to more closely replicate these experiments by 
employing a longer inter-stimulus interval of 2000 ms (2 seconds).
Experiment 5 found stronger eyeblink discrimination between false and true 
statements, but this discrimination develops very early in the session. As was 
discussed in Chapter 4, however, the responses acquired in this experiment appear 
more like operant avoidance responses than classically conditioned responses. The 
duration that the eye is closed, the rapidity of conditioning, and magnitude of 
discrimination all hint that these were operant responses to avoid the airpuff (see 
Martin, 1969). Experiment 6 further investigated this by testing the effect of a ratio 
UCS presentation and also attempting to use true statements as the conditioned 
stimulus, rather than just false statements. The results showed significant 
conditioning in the first 50 trials (continuous reinforcement) for both the false and 
true-statement reinforced conditions. Over the second 50 trials, however, in which 
only partial reinforcement was used, these responses dropped off drastically and 
there was no significant learning or discrimination.
The difficulties encountered using eyeblink conditioning were unexpected. 
The sensitivity to ISI, and the apparently operant nature of some of the responses 
made it difficult to interpret the results. There may be good reason for these 
difficulties if one looks at the nature of the eyeblink response. Given that most 
conditioning regarding eyeblink responses has very limited time between the CS and 
UCS (Kimble, 1968), these results are not so surprising (evolutionarily, the eyeblink 
response is meant to protect the eyes from things like objects flying at the face, etc.- 
complex stimuli (e.g. verbal stimuli) are seldom consistently paired with danger to 
the eyes specifically). Eyeblink conditioning might therefore only have limited 
effect with the verbal stimuli involved in this research, so later chapters returned to 
the use of physiological arousal, measured via skin conductance.
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7.2.3 Chapter 5 Summary
In Chapter 5, a SCR conditioning paradigm employed to examine deception 
and some of its components as conditioned stimuli. Experiment 7 examined 
subjects’ deception regarding these statements as a conditioned stimulus. The results 
of this experiment showed that for subjects where deception was the CS+, a strong 
discriminative skin conductance was observed for deception, but there was not a 
significant effect of conditioning block- indicating that this discrimination did not 
change significantly over trials. This suggests that subjects had an initial response to 
deception when the conditioning began, obscuring the effect of conditioning over 
trials. This is one of the first experiments known trying to accomplish this sort of 
conditioning to deception. The findings support the only other experiment 
attempting the use of deception as a conditioned stimulus: Jaffee, et al. (1966), and 
extend their results to apply to skin conductance as well as eyeblink. No significant 
discrimination was seen in subjects reinforced following truthful trials. This 
indicates that deceptive responses are more readily conditioned to elicit a 
physiological response than truthful responses. Considering that each subject likely 
already had a history of conditioning regarding deceptive responses, this is 
understandable.
Experiment 8 followed up Experiment 7 by testing whether the truth-value 
alone of the statements used could serve as a conditioned stimulus in this paradigm, 
as was done in Experiments 4, 5, and 6 with eyeblink responses. The results suggest 
that, regardless of whether true or false, the truth-value alone of presented statements 
does not serve as a strong conditioned stimulus. No significant effects were found in 
either group. This result is in contrast the results of Experiments 4, 5, and 6, and 
other previous research that has used truth-value as a conditioned response in 
eyeblink research (e.g., El'kin, 1957; Fleming, Grant, & North, 1968), and the 
discussion early regarding the potential operant nature of the eyeblink responses 
acquired is relevant.
Perhaps even more curious is the implication for deception. While we were 
able to condition a strong skin conductance response to deception, we were not able 
to do so to the truth-value of the same statements. This is a very curious effect, 
given that the truth-value of a statement is a necessary component to what makes a 
response deceptive (e.g. the statement “the cat is in the dustbin” is neither truthful 
nor deceptive considered independently of the fact whether the cat is actually in the
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dustbin) (see Chapter 4 for full discussion of truth-value). If this truth-value has no 
impact on the classically conditioned response, it must be something more directly 
about the behavior itself that allows deception to become a conditioned stimulus in 
such situations. This will be returned to shortly.
7.2.4 Chapter 6 Summary
I Following on Experiments 7 and 8 (Chapter 5), Experiments 9 and 10
i
| (Chapter 6) further explored the conditioning of a skin conductance response to
| deception using an internally consistent context for deception. Experiment 9
examined subject’s performance in acquiring a conditioned skin conductance 
response over 60 conditioning trials. Subjects in the normal shock condition 
acquired a significantly higher discriminatory response to their own deceptive 
responses over the course of conditioning than did subjects in the control condition. 
Ratio UCS presentation did not have a significant influence on the responses 
acquired. These results support the findings of Experiment 7 and the limited 
previous research showing that deception can serve as a conditioned stimulus (Jaffee, 
Millman, and Gorman, 1966), and expand upon them by showing that deception can 
serve as a conditioned stimulus in an artificial context without personal and 
situational implications. Experiment 10 tested the generalization of responses like 
those acquired in Experiment 9 to instances of deception that only the subject knew 
about. The conditioning trials from this experiment further supported the results 
from Experiments 7 and 9, with a strong conditioned response to deception being
| acquired. The generalization trials also showed a significant discrimination between
i
i deceptive and truthful trials, but only so for the trials on which subjects deceptively
i
claimed an innocent subject was guilty, not when they deceptively said that the guilty 
subject was innocent. This expands on previous findings by providing evidence that 
the conditioned responses acquired can generalize to new instances of deception 
regarding different topics and levels of public knowledge.
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7.3 Theoretical Implications
7.3.1 The effect of punishment on deception as a CS
According to the OTA (1983) and NRC (2003) a primary reason for the 
limited success of lie detection is the lack of a solid scientific explanation for the 
physiological responses it measures. Previous methods of lie detection have relied 
upon the assumption that deception is accompanied by increased physiological 
arousal, but little work has been done to understand the direct cause for this 
association.
The ‘fear of detection’ theory (see section 1.2.3.1, Chapter 1) states that a 
person exhibits physiological arousal when they are deceptive because they are 
afraid of getting caught and punished. This theory is supported by research into the 
situational variables that influence the accuracy of the polygraph (see section 1.3, 
Chapter 1). For example, the greater the consequences of being caught the more 
easily a person’s deception is detected via their physiological responses (Howlitze, & 
Raskin, 1988; Bradley & Warfield, 1984; Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1989). On the 
assumption that greater motivation to deceive translates into greater fear of being 
detected, this supports the fear of detection theory.
While the ‘fear of detection’ theory is useful for predicting the situations in 
which the polygraph is likely to have more accurate results, this is the limit of its 
utility. This theory, in its explanatory depth, does not go beyond the situation in 
which the polygraph is administered, and only seems to by its reference to internal 
events as explanatory mechanisms. It posits “fear” as the cause of the response 
measured by the polygraph, but it does not explain where this “fear” comes from.
The only reference to the outside of the organism it makes is the immediate situation 
that causes the fear, but the real question is how the situation and situations like it 
have come to cause fear. The origin of these responses must eventually be traced 
back to the conditioning history of the individual. It is in this history that the causes 
of the responses measured by the polygraph are to be found. Without looking at 
these causes, we can never hope to control or improve the responses that the 
polygraph relies upon, and never hope to improve the polygraph or similar methods.
Skinner (1953) proposed that the physiological responses that a person 
exhibits when they are deceptive are the “emotional effects of the conditioned stimuli 
aroused by punished behavior” (Skinner, 1953, pg. 187). On this theory, it is the
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previous punishment that has followed deception and the situations in which 
deception occurs that causes a person to exhibit physiological arousal when they are 
deceptive. While both theories refer to punishment in their explanations, the fear of 
detection theory refers to potential future punishment, whereas Skinner refers to past 
punishment.
The results from Experiments 2 and 3 (Chapter 3) of the present thesis 
demonstrated that the previous punishment a person exhibits in their natural 
environment can cause an increased physiological response when engaging in similar 
verbal behavior. This supports Skinner’s assertion that past punishment in a person’s 
conditioning history can translate into physiological arousal. This provides an 
important link between physiological arousal in a particular setting, and the general 
conditioning people receive in their normal environment- a link that later chapters 
would rely on in explaining the responses exhibited during deception. People are 
often punished for swearing, and as seen in Chapter 3 (Experiment 2), have an 
increased skin conductance response when they swear, and greater previous 
punishment causes greater skin conductance (Experiment 3). People are often 
punished for being deceptive, and as seen in the polygraph have an increased skin 
conductance response when they are deceptive.
The results of experiment 7 (Chapter 5) and experiments 9 and 10 (Chapter 6) 
provided further evidence for this theory by showing that a skin conductance 
response can be conditioned to instances of deception in a laboratory setting. When 
paired with a mild electric shock, deception becomes a conditioned stimulus for 
increased physiological arousal. This provides a direct mechanism by which the 
punishment a person receives in their social environment can cause a tendency to 
have increased arousal when they are deceptive, which is then picked up by devices 
such as the polygraph. Whereas the ‘fear of detection’ theory relies on immediate 
situational variables to explain why a person would be afraid of being caught, and 
hence have increased arousal, these experiments conditioned a response to deception 
in the absence of any situational variables that would tend to increase the arousal a 
person exhibits when deceptive. There was practically no motivation to deceive, no 
mock crime was employed, and the subjects used were students who had no vested 
interest in beating the machine. Despite relatively poor situational variables from the 
perspective of polygraph accuracy, a strong skin conductance response to deception 
was acquired.
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7.3.2 Components of deception
As was discussed in Chapter 4, strongly related to the topic of deception is 
the truth or falsity of statements. Truth-value is a component of deception. This 
raises the question of whether the simple truth-value of statements can itself serve as 
a conditioned stimulus. This question was addressed in the present thesis using two 
different types of conditioned responses. Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter 4) 
examined whether truth-value can serve as a conditioned stimulus in an eyeblink 
conditioning paradigm, and experiment 7 (Chapter 5) examined whether it can serve 
as a conditioned stimulus in skin conductance conditioning paradigm. Taken 
together, these experiments provided mixed results. The eyeblink conditioning 
paradigm provided some evidence that truth-value can serve as a conditioned 
stimulus, corroborating previous findings (El'kin, 1957; Fleming, Grant, & North, 
1968). Experiment 7 (Chapter 5), however, found no evidence that truth-value can 
serve as a conditioned stimulus for a skin conductance response. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, there is reason to err on the side of the Experiment 7 in this case.
Eyeblink responses can be operantly as well as classically controlled by the 
environment (they can be “voluntary” as well as “involuntary”), whereas skin 
conductance responses cannot. Given that the truth-value of statements is a 
discriminative stimulus for much operant behavior, it is very possible that the 
responses acquired in Experiments 4, 5, 6 (Chapter 4), as well as in previous findings 
by other researchers, were operant responses. This is supported by the demonstrated 
effect of statement duration on the responses acquired in those experiments. The 
skin conductance results of Experiment 7, however, are not susceptible to such a 
criticism, and hence should be trusted in this case. This leaves us with the final 
conclusion from the results here that it is unlikely that the truth-value of statements 
can become a purely classical conditioned stimulus over the course of one training 
session. This makes sense, considering that such a classically conditioned response 
would have little practical value.
Another issue flagged by the examination of the components of deception in 
this thesis is the past conditioning histories involved in each component studied. As 
was mentioned in earlier chapters (e.g. section 5.4, Chapter 5), each of the verbal 
stimuli used in this thesis came with previous conditioning histories, and in fact
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relied upon those histories for their capacity to become conditioned stimuli. The 
core argument of this thesis is that deception is punished in a person’s natural social 
environment and this leads to a conditioned physiological response when it is 
engaged in. Hence, when we attempt to condition a skin conductance response to 
deception in the laboratory (as in Experiments 7, 9, and 10), we are not starting with 
a neutral conditioned stimulus. This explains why in these experiments we were able 
to acquire significant discrimination between the responses to truthful and deceptive 
answers, but often not a significant change in this discrimination over trial block. 
Subjects already had some discrimination to their own deception, and hence it was 
difficult to show them acquiring such discrimination. This problem was overcome 
by using control groups, and showing a difference between conditioning subjects and 
controls (e.g., see especially Experiments 9 and 10 (Chapter 6)). This problem does 
have broader implications, however. In summary, people have skin conductance 
responses to their own deception, which are learned over many years of social 
conditioning, and which are difficult to overturn in a few hours of laboratory 
conditioning. The comparison of truthful vs. deceptive responses in Experiment 7 
(Chapter 5) demonstrates exactly how difficult it is to override this previous 
conditioning. Whereas deception readily served as a conditioned stimulus when 
paired with the unconditioned stimulus, truthful responses did not. For practical 
purposes, it may be difficult to override this previous conditioning when attempting 
to create new responses for use in lie detection, and we may have to always settle for 
improving and building upon the previously conditioned responses already 
established.
An interesting topic raised by the difference between deception and false 
statements is that of wrong statements. In a sense, there is little difference between 
uttering a statement that is wrong and uttering one that is deceptive, as both involve 
false statements. In terms of consequences, however, there is a very real difference. 
Each time a child says something that is false, or untrue, they are more likely to be 
corrected than to be punished for being deceptive. While being corrected is likely 
aversive, especially if it is done in a public manner, it is arguable whether such 
correction can condition being wrong to be a conditioned stimulus for physiological 
arousal, as is done in deception. One reason for this is that people “know” when they 
are being deceptive, but not necessarily when they are being wrong. When one is 
corrected following an inaccurate statement, it is often surprising- as it was not
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suspected that the statement was false until it was corrected. When one is deceptive, 
however, they often anticipate that a very real consequence might be being detected 
and challenged on it. This difference in consequences between deceptive and wrong 
statements might be what shapes them as different classes of stimuli in verbal 
behavior.
7.3.3 Differences between experimental and real-life conditioning
The conditioning in this thesis regarding deception occurred primarily in a 
laboratory. As with all laboratory research, this raises questions regarding the 
similarity between the conditioning used in these studies and the sorts of 
conditioning that might surround “real-life” instances of deception. There are at 
least two ways in which the conditioning here necessarily differs from real-life 
conditioning that would surround deception: the nature of the consequences 
following the deception and the temporal relationship between the deception and the 
consequences. These will each be addressed separately.
7.3.3.1 Nature of punishing consequences
In real life instances of deception, the punishment following deception is 
probably as varied as the deception itself. Whereas in the laboratory, the same 
punishment followed each instance of deception (a mild electric shock of almost 
exactly the same magnitude), in real life each instance of deception will be followed 
by unique punishment. From the spanking of a parent to the loss of trust with a 
spouse (Cole, 2001), each instance of deception will have its own consequence.
There are converging lines of evidence that variation in the punishing consequences 
for a behavior can impact the conditioned responses (McSweeney, Swindell & 
Weatherly, 1996; Rescorla, R.A., 1980).
7.3.3.2 Temporal relation between deception and punishment
In real life instances of deception, it is probably rare that punishment 
consistently follows 3 to 5 seconds following each instance of deception. Depending 
upon the occurrence of deception, it might come instantly- as when one is instantly 
challenged on a statement they make in an aggressive tone, to when one is addressed 
days later for an instance of deception that has only now been discovered. There is
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wide variation in the temporal relationship between deception and punishment in 
everyday life. This is a problem, as the effect of conditioning is highly influenced by 
the temporal relationship between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli 
(Skinner, 1938; Pavlov, 1927). If there is a gap between the deception and the 
punishment, the effect of the punishment in developing a conditioned response to the 
deception is decreased.
In explaining this, however, there are two important facts to take into 
account: First, it is noteworthy that in children the punishment for deception 
probably comes more rapidly that for adults. Children are notoriously bad at lying, 
and easy to catch (Talwar & Lee, 2002). Hence their instances of deception are 
caught out and punished as rapidly as other undesirable verbal behaviors. This might 
provide an initial conditioning that is later diversified as they become better at 
deceiving and the consequences become more delayed and intermittent.
A second important note is that there are likely many other conditioned 
stimuli associated with the punishment that follows deception, and can bridge the 
temporal gap between instances of deception and punishment. Between the actual 
instance of deception and the punishment that follows if it is detected there are 
numerous events that will become conditioned stimuli for future emotional responses 
based on their association with the punishment to come. Facts emerging that 
contradict a deceptive story, looks of distrust from one lied to, awkward silence, 
repetitious asking of the same questions, all become subtle cues over the course of 
ones conditioning that one is not being believed, and hence punishment is likely.
7.4 Future Research
The present thesis has explored the responses measured by the polygraph as 
conditioned stimuli, linking them to potential events in the past of the individual that 
may have caused them. This is useful in presenting a new way of looking at lie 
detection procedures to date, and challenging the practice of passively using 
responses that already exist to measure deception. The implication of the present 
research is that these responses can be modified, and potentially improved. For 
interventions to be developed to improve the accuracy of lie detection methods, 
however, a great deal of research must further examine the contingencies
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surrounding natural instances of deception, and improving the strength and 
generalization of the responses acquired in the laboratory.
7.4.1 Future research into natural deception
The present research only scratched the surface of the intricate ways in which 
punishment in individual’s environment can lead to the highly context sensitive 
physiological arousal measured by the polygraph (e.g., see section 1.4.1, Chapter 1). 
While the goal of the present thesis was simply to demonstrate the basic mechanism 
by which deception can become the conditioned stimulus for a physiological 
response, there are countless other conditioned stimuli in the environment of any 
deceptive response that overlap onto this response- either strengthening or 
weakening it. As mentioned in section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1, for example, the presence 
of an authority figure becomes one such stimulus- mediating the physiological 
arousal observed. It could be argued that the presence of an authority figure in itself 
serves as a conditioned aversive stimulus, implying that any punishment received 
will be greater (e.g. Milgram, 1963). Research into the ways in which other stimuli 
come to mediate the conditioned response a person exhibits to their own deception 
would be highly valuable for the potential practical improvements it might offer to 
lie detection.
7.4.2 Future research into improving the deception response
7.4.2.1 Improving strength of deception response
The terminal discrimination acquired in the experiments in this thesis 
between deceptive and truthful responses was adequate for demonstrating the effect 
of conditioning, but unfortunately it usually fell short of what would be required to 
practically detect the subject’s deception. The experiments employed in this thesis 
used many, e.g. Experiments 9 used 48 subjects, whereas for the purposes of 
practical lie detection the individual subject is important. As argued by NRC (2003, 
pg. 160), we cannot hide behind participant numbers in lie detection research. The 
result is that, while the results of the current experiments were very encouraging, 
future research will need to shift from trying to demonstrate the effect of 
conditioning to looking at results in terms of accuracy- and comparing this accuracy 
to other methods of lie detection. Within the scope of intervention-accuracy
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research, there are several obvious variables that can be manipulated to test their 
impact. Among these variables are the number of conditioning trials used (Papka & 
Woodruff-Pak, 1996), the UCS ratio employed (Pavlov, 1927), the magnitude of the 
UCS (Wieland et al., 1963) and whether this magnitude remains constant or is made 
variable, and even the use of several different types of UCS in conjunction. It may 
be that careful manipulation of these variables and finding an optimal balance 
produces a conditioned response consistent and strong enough to be relied upon to 
infer deception.
7.4.2.2 Improving generalization of deception response
As seen in Experiment 10 (Chapter 6), the generalization of the conditioned 
skin conductance response to deception was not ideal. The response conditioned to 
instances of deception where the experimenter knew the true answer did not seem to 
generalize effectively to instances of deception where the experimenter didn’t know 
the true answer. This is a very important point, perhaps the most important in the 
thesis- as all lie detection hinges on the barrier between what is objectively known 
and what is known only to the examined individual (Wolpe, Foster & Langleben, 
2005). On the assumption that a strong discriminative response can be conditioned 
to deception using the methods discussed in the previous section, this response 
would be useless if it was only elicited by instances of deception that the 
experimenter/examiner already knew were deceptive. Somehow, it must be 
generalized to instances of deception that the examiner does not know are deceptive, 
and that the subject knows the examiner does not know are deceptive.
In traditional polygraph tests, something like this is done with what are called 
“stim-tests” (Saxe, Dougherty & Cross, 1985). A “stim-test” is basically an accuracy 
demonstration to the subject prior to a polygraph test, showing them that the test can 
detect lies even when the polygraph examiner doesn’t know the true answer (Reid & 
Inbau, 1966). For example, in one stim-test in which a deck of cards is used, and the 
examiner tricks the subject into thinking they don’t know which card the subject 
drew by using a deck of cards loaded with only that card. Then, the examiner credits 
the polygraph readings with telling them when the subject was deceptive regarding 
which card they had drawn. In this manner, the polygraph examiner attempts to 
generalize the subject’s conditioned physiological responses to instances of
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deception that the subject believes the examiner to not know- with the basis that the 
machine will know regardless. In a sense, this demonstration is meant to extinguish 
the examiner’s knowledge as discriminative stimulus in determining the occurrence 
of the conditioned physiological response to deception.
A similar procedure could be used in the conditioning methods described in 
Experiment 10. If partial knowledge is known of the murder suspect, this partial 
knowledge could be used to continue delivering the UCS on some generalization 
trials, and withholding it on others. This would greatly “blur the line” between what 
the experimenter knows and doesn’t know, potentially allowing greater 
generalization of the response. Future research should try methods such as this to 
improve the generalization acquired to unknown instances of deception, while also 
utilizing methods like those described in the previous section.
Another type of generalization required for this research to be put into 
practical application for lie detection is the topic the deception is regarding. The 
deception in the previous experiments was regarding relatively contrived topics, such 
as murderers in Cluedo-type scenarios. If a conditioned response to deception 
acquired regarding these sorts of topics were then measured following instances of 
deception regarding a real-life crime investigation, the generalization of the response 
would probably suffer in proportion to the difference between the topics of deception 
(see Skinner, 1953 for a discussion of generalization and shared properties of 
stimuli). As was seen in Chapter 6, this is a potential confounding variable in 
Experiment 10, as the murder suspects were dissimilar to those used in the 
conditioning trials. How much greater would the lack of generalization be if applied 
to bits of information the subject had learned prior to the conditioning altogether, 
such as a car they had seen the previous week? As a rough sort of estimate, it is 
expected that future research will find that for a conditioning method to be used in 
practical lie detection, the sorts of questions used in the deception conditioning will 
have to be tailored in each case to fit the sort of target questions that will be asked in 
the actual examination, thereby limiting the differences across which generalization 
must occur.
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7.5 Concluding Comments
The current research has implications for the traditional polygraph. As is 
often the case with practical methods, the polygraph has adapted to acquire the best 
results it can, given its initial assumptions. Without an understanding of how 
previous punishment has shaped the responses it uses, it relies on techniques (e.g. the 
“stim-tests” mentioned above) that maximize the similarities between the situation in 
which the subject is examined and previous situations in which their deception has 
been punished. Interrogation-type questioning, demonstrations of accuracy, and 
challenging of the subject’s veracity are all calculated to make the subject feel like 
punishment is imminent if they are deceptive. The ‘fear of detection’ theory works 
to explain how these methods might strengthen the results acquired by the polygraph, 
but offers only indirect explanation of the origins of these responses. It does not 
provide an adequate explanation for why subjects actually have physiological arousal 
when they are deceptive. Reference to an internal state (“fear”) masks the situational 
contingencies required to shape these responses to deception. As has been argued 
throughout this thesis, this is inadequate, and the polygraph has gone as far as it 
possibly can using these assumptions.
By showing that deception can become a conditioned stimulus, the work 
presented here provides a behavioral mechanism that bridges the gap between 
deception and physiological arousal. This is an important step forward, as a lack of 
understanding the cause of the responses relied upon by the polygraph has been a 
main reason for its failure to advance. If lie detection is to advance, it must begin 
looking into the modification and improvement of the responses it uses, not simply 
new ways to passively measure them. The next step in this research should be to 
apply the conditioning procedures developed in this thesis to mock-crime scenarios, 
testing whether exposure to a short conditioning session can improve the 
effectiveness of subsequent polygraph examination. There is reason to believe that 
the results could be significantly improved. Additionally, it was found in conducting 
the present studies that whether or not a particular subject will be a “good 
conditioner” could usually be guessed at with some accuracy within the first 30 trials 
of conditioning. Possibilities such as this will become an empirical question when 
this research is turned towards practical application.
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Appendix A: Words used in Experiments 1,2, and 3 (Chapter 3)
Swear Emotional
1 cunt 1 weapon
2 shit 2 hate
3 fuck 3 death
4 asshole 4 suicide
5 cocksucker 5 humiliation
6 motherfucker 6 execution
7 wanker 7 torture
8 crap 8 violence
9 bastard 9 cancer
10 twat 10 murder
Filler Matched
1 light 1 land
2 window 2 film
3 animal 3 glass
4 building 4 chair
5 green 5 concentrate
6 brick 6 candlestick
7 plaza 7 noisy
8 science 8 feed
9 waffle 9 bowl
10 gam e 10 pencil
11 glass
12 carpet
13 dreams
14 local
15 bird
16 throw
17 coast
18 shirt
19 camera
20 clock
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Appendix B: Offensiveness questionnaire used in Experiments 1 and 3 (Chapter 3)
Please indicate how offensive you find the following words using the 
scale provided.
N o t
O f f e n s i v e
shit
asshole
crap
bastard
twat
weapon
hate
death
etc.
V e r y
O f f e n s i v e
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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Appendix C: Emotionality questionnaire used in Experiments 1 and 3 (Chapter 3)
Please indicate how emotionally arousing you find the following
words using the scale provided.
N o t  V e r y
E m o t i o n a l  E m o t i o n a l
weapon 1 2  3 4 5
hate 1 2 3 4 5
death 1 2 3 4 5
twat 1 2 3 4 5
shit 1 2 3 4 5
execution 1 2 3 4 5
torture 1 2 3 4 5
violence 1 2 3 4 5
etc.
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Appendix D: Previous punishment and frequency questionnaire used in Experiments
1 and 3 (Chapter 3)
P l e a s e  a n s w e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
q u e s t i o n s
How old a re  you?
W hat is your religion?
W hat sex  a re  y o u ?  F e m a l e  M a l e
W hat is th e  h ighest level of education 
acquired by your m other?
W hat is th e  h ighest level of education 
acquired by your fa ther?
Never
Very
Often
Roughly how often do you sw ear each 
day? 1 2  3 4 5
N ever Always
Did your p a ren ts  often punish you for 
sw earing? 1 2  3 4 5
Never O ften
As a child, did you often se e  o thers 
punished for sw earing? 1 2  3 4 5
Never Often
As a child, did you often se e  o thers  
sw earing? 1 2  3 4 5
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Appendix E: Statements used in Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Chapter 4)
Trial Statement Truth Value
1 You are sitting in a chair TRUE
2 The world is round TRUE
3 You are the Queen of England FALSE
4 Books have pages TRUE
5 You own a kangaroo FALSE
6 Acorns are nuts TRUE
7 Circles are round TRUE
8 This room has a desk TRUE
9 Elephants have scales FALSE
10 This room is in a building TRUE
11 The Sun is smaller than the Earth FALSE
12 Humans are green FALSE
13 This room has windows FALSE
14 The world is flat FALSE
15 Sheep have wool TRUE
16 Mice are smaller than cats TRUE
17 You eat rocks FALSE
18 Beer is a liquid TRUE
19 Lead is heavier than paper TRUE
20 Days are longer than weeks FALSE
21 Swansea is in China FALSE
22 Strawberries are fruits TRUE
23 You are in Australia FALSE
24 Grass is blue FALSE
25 This room has computers TRUE
26 Pigeons are birds TRUE
27 You live in an igloo FALSE
28 Humans are plants FALSE
29 Squirrels are birds FALSE
30 W ater is a liquid TRUE
31 Pigs can fly FALSE
32 Flowers are reptiles FALSE
33 The sun orbits the earth FALSE
34 Squirrels climb trees TRUE
35 Rocks are alive FALSE
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36 This room is silent FALSE
37 Birds have feathers TRUE
38 Albert Einstein was a physicist TRUE
39 You are an astronaut FALSE
40 You are looking at a computer TRUE
41 Penguins are reptiles FALSE
42 Lead is w orth more than gold FALSE
43 Humans lay eggs FALSE
44 This room has walls TRUE
45 Carrots are vegetables TRUE
46 Swansea has beaches TRUE
47 Humans have feathers FALSE
48 Birds have wings TRUE
49 Libraries have books TRUE
50 You own an island FALSE
51 Sheep are mammals TRUE
52 Humans need food to survive TRUE
53 Jesus was a penguin FALSE
54 London is in the U.K. TRUE
55 You are younger than 70 TRUE
56 You are sitting on a couch FALSE
57 You have a head TRUE
58 Roses are flowers TRUE
59 Paper is heavier than lead FALSE
60 The Earth is spinning TRUE
61 Bananas are yellow TRUE
62 You are a tree FALSE
63 London is in Wales FALSE
64 Violins are instruments TRUE
65 You are a student TRUE
66 Paris is in America FALSE
67 Money grows on trees FALSE
68 Red is a colour TRUE
69 You are a sausage FALSE
70 Cats are larger than horses FALSE
71 China is in Asia TRUE
72 The Earth orbits the moon FALSE
73 W ater is heavier than air TRUE
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74 You are a human TRUE
75 Snow is white TRUE
76 You are studying dentistry FALSE
77 You are in Wales TRUE
78 Bananas are purple FALSE
79 The Sun is hot TRUE
80 Cars have wheels TRUE
81 Humans live under w ater FALSE
82 The sky is blue TRUE
83 Lead is heavier than wood TRUE
84 Triangles have 3 sides TRUE
85 This room is full of w ater FALSE
86 Swansea is in Wales TRUE
87 Fish live in w ater TRUE
88 Salt tastes sweet FALSE
89 Humans are reptiles FALSE
90 Chickens lay eggs TRUE
91 London is in China FALSE
92 You have 3 eyes FALSE
93 You sleep in a bed TRUE
94 Humans need air TRUE
95 You sleep in a pile of hay FALSE
96 Keyboards have buttons TRUE
97 Pens have ink FALSE
98 Fire is cold FALSE
99 Humans are mortal TRUE
100 This room has no ceiling FALSE
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Appendix F: Statements used in Experiments 7 and 8 (Chapter 5)
Trial S tatem ent Truth-Value
1 Y o u  a r e  s i t t i n g  i n  a  c h a i r T r u e
2 T h e  w o r l d  i s  r o u n d T r u e
3 Y o u  a r e  t h e  Q u e e n  o f  E n g l a n d F a l s e
4 B o o k s  h a v e  p a g e s T r u e
5 Y o u  o w n  a  k a n g a r o o F a l s e
6 A c o r n s  a r e  n u t s T r u e
7 M o n e y  g r o w s  o n  t r e e s F a l s e
8 T h i s  r o o m  h a s  a  d e s k T r u e
9 E l e p h a n t s  h a v e  s c a l e s F a l s e
1 0 T h i s  r o o m  i s  i n  a  b u i l d i n g T r u e
1 1 T h e  S u n  i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  E a r t h F a l s e
1 2 H u m a n s  a r e  g r e e n F a l s e
1 3 T h i s  r o o m  h a s  w i n d o w s F a l s e
1 4 T h e  w o r l d  i s  f l a t F a l s e
1 5 S h e e p  h a v e  w o o l T r u e
1 6 M i c e  a r e  s m a l l e r  t h a n  c a t s T r u e
1 7 Y o u  e a t  r o c k s F a l s e
1 8 B e e r  i s  a  l i q u i d T r u e
1 9 L e a d  i s  h e a v i e r  t h a n  p a p e r T r u e
2 0 D a y s  a r e  l o n g e r  t h a n  w e e k s F a l s e
2 1 S w a n s e a  i s  i n  C h i n a F a l s e
2 2 S t r a w b e r r i e s  a r e  f r u i t s T r u e
2 3 Y o u  a r e  i n  A u s t r a l i a F a l s e
2 4 G r a s s  i s  b l u e F a l s e
2 5 T h i s  r o o m  h a s  c o m p u t e r s T r u e
2 6 P i g e o n s  a r e  b i r d s T r u e
2 7 Y o u  l i v e  i n  a n  i g l o o F a l s e
2 8 H u m a n s  a r e  p l a n t s F a l s e
2 9 A l b e r t  E i n s t e i n  w a s  a  p h y s i c i s t T r u e
3 0 S q u i r r e l s  a r e  b i r d s F a l s e
3 1 W a t e r  i s  a  l i q u i d T r u e
3 2 P i g s  c a n  f l y F a l s e
3 3 B a n a n a s  a r e  y e l l o w T r u e
3 4 T h e  s u n  o r b i t s  t h e  e a r t h F a l s e
3 5 S q u i r r e l s  c l i m b  t r e e s T r u e
3 6 R o c k s  a r e  a l i v e F a l s e
3 7 T h i s  r o o m  i s  s i l e n t F a l s e
3 8 B i r d s  h a v e  f e a t h e r s T r u e
3 9 Y o u  a r e  a n  a s t r o n a u t F a l s e
4 0 Y o u  a r e  l o o k i n g  a t  a  c o m p u t e r T r u e
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Appendix G: Suspect cards used in Experiments 9 and 10 (Chapter 6)
Colonel Mustard Miss Scarlet
--------------------
Mm. White
fxirnsnw jmiOfOQ
Mr. Green
uaajQ JW
Professor Plum
lunjj jofisjfojj
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Appendix H: Weapon cards used in Experiments 9 and 10 (Chapter 6)
<pglSI?k¥i»
! i
taaa m p
m s s tm w D
CEgjglgKEff)
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Appendix I: Generalization suspects used in Experiment 10 (Chapter 6)
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